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1. Cass R. Sunstein, In Memoriam: Justice Antonin Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (2016); Jamal Greene,
Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 325, 326 (2009) (arguing that Heller
was a departure from Scalia¶s usual approach that may prove to be the doctrine¶s high-water mark).
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3. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624±25
(1991).
4. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97±98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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7KRXJK WKH ODWH -XVWLFH $QWRQLQ 6FDOLD¶V RULJLQDOLVW DSSURDFK ZDV RIWHQ
controversial,1 his Fourth Amendment jurisprudence proved something of an exception²
many tributes after his passing SRUWUD\HGKLPDVD³GHIHQGHU´RIWKDWDPHQGPHQW 2 In a
line of cases from 1991 to 2013, Scalia reestablished the premise that the Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted through the lens of the Founding era, 3 critiqued the
³QRWRULRXVO\ XQKHOSIXO´ UHDVRQDEOH expectation of privacy standard created in Katz v.
United States,4 DQGHVWDEOLVKHGZKDWPD\EHWHUPHGD³SURSHUW\-SOXV´V\QWKHVLVMXVWLILHG
RQWKHJURXQGVWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VWUDGLWLRQDODSSURDFKWRZDUG)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWFDVHVKDG
been tied to property rights, including most notably the common law of trespass. 5
:K\ZDV6FDOLD¶VDSSURDFKWRWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWDSSUHFLDWHGPRUHZLGHO\WKDQ
VRPHRIKLVRWKHURULJLQDOLVWZRUN"7KLV$UWLFOHFRPSDUHV6FDOLD¶VRULJLQDOLVP-in-practice
WRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VKLVWRULFDl treatment of the Fourth Amendment and finds that²far
from a revolution in legal affairs²his property-plus synthesis was largely consistent with
WKH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKLQWKHQLQHWHHQWh and early twentieth centuries and even holds some
commonalities with thDW RI WKH :DUUHQ &RXUW 0RUH LPSRUWDQW WKDQ 6FDOLD¶V UKHWRULFDO
return to the primacy of property rights and the common law of trespass was his successful
effort to use the property line as a bulwark against erosion of the privacy right embedded
in the Fourth Amendment. That is, Scalia returned to property law to expand privacy
protections, not constrict them.
7KHILUVW3DUWRIWKLV$UWLFOHUHYLHZV6FDOLD¶VWKHRU\RIRULJLQDOLVPDQGLWVFULWLFV
while the second considers whether the origins of the Fourth Amendment are sufficiently
knowable to allow for a strictly originalist mode of analysis. Specifically, Part II reviews
the extensive work of legal historians on the original intent and meaning of the Fourth
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I. ORIGINALISM AND ITS CRITIQUES
The theory of originalism arose in reaction to the perceived excesses of the Warren
Court.12 Justice Scalia colorfully lampooned thH³LQWR[LFDWLQJ´DSSURDFKRIFRPPRQ-law
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6. Scalia¶s other Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is also well-known, but this Article focuses on the
enumerated places clause because of its centrality to the property-plus synthesis.
7. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
11. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018); Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018).
12. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1089 (2015)
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$PHQGPHQWLQSDUWLFXODULWV³SHUVRQVKRXVHVSDSHUVDQGHIIHFWV´FODXVH²the focus of
this Article.6 This provides the foundation necessary to analyze how the Court relied on
history over time, discussing the pre-Revolutionary era common law origins of the Fourth
Amendment on both sides of the Atlantic, in Revolutionary state constitutions, and in
debates over the new Constitution and the drafting of the Fourth Amendment, with an
original focus on the contributions of moderate Antifederalists whose ultimate cooperation
was essential to ratification.
The QH[WIRXU3DUWVH[DPLQHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VXVHRIKLVWRULFDOVRXUFHVLQLWVNH\
Fourth Amendment decisions from the seminal Boyd v. United States7 in 1886 through
6FDOLD¶V SDVVLQJ 3DUW ,,, FRQVLGHUV ZKDW PD\ EH WHUPHG WKH WUDGLWLRQDOLVW HUD IURP WKH
Founding through the early twentieth century. Typified by Boyd, the Court examined
Founding-era documents and common law antecedents to discern the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment²considering property rights, but keeping focus on broader principles.
Part I9 ORRNV DW WKH &RXUW¶V IRUPDOLVW era, during the early-to-mid twentieth century.
Typified by Olmstead v. United States,8 WKH&RXUW¶VOLWHUDOLVWDSSURDFKIRFXVHGH[FOXVLYHO\
on property, but relied more on analogy to precedent than on historical work. Part V
examines the legal realist approach of the Warren Court. Best known for Katz v. United
States9 but more typified by two lesser-known predecessors, the Court relied on
consequentialism based in Founding-era principles. And Part VI looks at the ascendancy
RIRULJLQDOLVPGXULQJ6FDOLD¶VWHQXUHGHVFULELQJKLVPL[WXUHRISULQFLSOHDQGSURSHUW\ODZ
Taken together, this survey demonstrates conclusively that the Court has been fairly
consistent in applying quasioriginalist techniques, incorporating historical analysis to
discern something like original meaning or original intent.
Finally, Part VII analyzes the three key Fourth AmenGPHQW FDVHV RI WKH &RXUW¶V
2017±2018 term and offers cautious predictions about how it is likely to proceed. Most
notably, the five opinions in Carpenter v. United States10 represent three distinct
DOWHUQDWLYHV&KLHI-XVWLFH5REHUWV¶PDMRULW\RSLQLRQDQG-XVWLFH.HQQHG\¶VGLVVHQWORRN
to Katz and the common law; Justices Thomas and Alito take a stridently originalist
approach; and Justice Gorsuch²like Scalia before him²offers a careful mixture of the
two. 7KH$UWLFOHFRQFOXGHVWKDW*RUVXFK¶VDSSURDFKOLNHWKH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKLQWKHRWKHU
two cases,11 is in keeping with the traditional approach to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence²and projects that this paradigm is likely to once again become the
dominant one in the years to come.
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MXGJLQJDVFRQWUDU\WR³DWUHQG in government that has developed in recent centuries, called
GHPRFUDF\´13 And he insisted that his preferred method of interpretation, originalism,
RIIHUV D ZD\ IRU MXGJHV WR UHDFK D ³FRUUHFW´ UHVXOW²its difficulties and uncertainties
negligible compared to a philosophy that allows the Constitution to change. 14 But for that
to be true, it must not only be the case that common-ODZMXGJHV³JHWLWZURQJ´EXWLWPXVW
also be possible for orLJLQDOLVP WR ³JHW LW ULJKW´ 6XESDUW $ VWHSV WKURXJK RYHU WKUHH
decades of arguments as to the latter point, while Subpart B examines more recent critiques
RI WKH WKHRU\¶V VHULRXV PHWKRGRORJLFDO OLPLWV DQG FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH FULWLTXHV FDQ EH
synthesized into an approach that could be called incremental originalism, a descriptive
term for how the Supreme Court²including Scalia²generally used history in its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.15
A. Proponents: Eliding History’s Limits
The oft-cited origin of originalism is a 1971 law review article by Robert Bork that
GHVFULEHGWKH:DUUHQ&RXUWDVSRVLQJLQ³DFXWHIRUP´WKHLVVXHRIZKHQWKHDXWKRULW\RI
the Supreme Court is legitimate.16 %RUNWKRXJKWLW³GHSORUDEOH´WRH[SHFWWKDW³WKHQDWXUH
of the Constitution will change, often quite dramatically, as the personnel of the Supreme
&RXUW FKDQJHV´17 Extending rather dramatically the argument of Herbert Wechsler, 18
%RUNDUJXHGWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VOHJLWLPDF\UHTXLUHGLWWRDSSO\³SULQFLSOHVWKDWDUHQHXWUDOO\
derived, definHGDQGDSSOLHG´19 %RUN¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIwhich principles was limited, but
KH GLG VD\ WKDW WKHUH DUH RQO\ ³WZR SURSHU PHWKRGV RI GHULYLQJ ULJKWV IURP WKH
&RQVWLWXWLRQ´²WKHILUVWWKRVH³UDWKHUVSHFLILFYDOXHVWKDWWH[WRUKLVWRU\VKRZWKHIUDPHUV
actually tRKDYHLQWHQGHG´DQGWKHVHFRQGWKRVHUHVXOWLQJ³IURPJRYHUQPHQWDOSURFHVVHV
HVWDEOLVKHGE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ´20 The former became known as original intent. 21 This
nascent precept soon appeared in the judiciary, though again more as critique than
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(connecting originalism to the Warren Court¶s desegregation decisions and describing it as, ³in part, an
expression of, and a response to, anxieties that were widely felt during the Nixon era and that had cultural and
political roots, no less than legal ones´).
13. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 7, 9 (1997).
14. Id. at 45±46.
15. Scalia himself might not have liked this term. See Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16
CHAP. L. REV. 325, 341 (2013) (coining the term to critique the challengers to the Affordable Care Act as focused
on ³moving the Constitution towards original meaning without even arguing that non-originalist precedents
should be overturned´).
16. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1971).
17. Id.
18. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959)
(critiquing the Court¶s frequent failure to articulate such principles in its decisions).
19. Bork, supra note 16, at 23 (applying his concepts to First Amendment law).
20. Id. at 17.
21. At least in a limited form, nonoriginalists did not necessarily see this principle as all that controversial.
Paul Brest described a rather limited debate between moderate originalists ³who acknowledge[] that the text and
original history are often indeterminate . . . [b]ut adjudication may not proceed in the absence of authorization
from some original source, and when the text or original history speaks clearly it is binding,´ and nonoriginalists,
who treat ³the text and original history as presumptively binding and limiting, but as neither a necessary nor
sufficient condition for constitutional decisionmaking.´ Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 237±38 (1980).
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theory.22
The Reagan Administration made the theory more explicit²and more political. In
1985, $WWRUQH\*HQHUDO(GZLQ0HHVHFDOOHGIRU³DMXULVSUXGHQFHRIRULJLQDOLQWHQWLRQ´
GHFODULQJ LW $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ SROLF\ WR ³HQGHDYRU WR UHVXUUHFW WKH RULJLQDO PHDQLQJ RI
constLWXWLRQDOSURYLVLRQVDQG VWDWXWHVDVWKHRQO\UHOLDEOHJXLGHIRUMXGJPHQW´ 23 While
-XVWLFH :LOOLDP %UHQQDQ LPSXJQHG ³RULJLQDO LQWHQWLRQLVP´ DV ³DUURJDQFH FORDNHG LQ
KXPLOLW\´ JLYHQ WKH VSDUVHQHVV DQG FRPSOH[LW\ RI WKH KLVWRULFDO UHFRUG 24 Meese
confidently UHVSRQGHG WKDW ³WKH PHDQLQJ RI WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ FDQ EH NQRZQ´ 25 His
prescription for knowing it, however, was limited: specific language should be obeyed;
FRQVHQVXVSULQFLSOHVVKRXOGEHIROORZHGDQGDPELJXLW\VKRXOGEHUHVROYHG³VRDVWRDW
least not contUDGLFWWKHWH[WRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQLWVHOI´ 26
Justice Scalia, confirmed to the Supreme Court in 1987, was similarly modest about
the potential of originalism²WHUPLQJ LW ³WKH OHVVHU HYLO´ QH[W WR RSLQLRQV ³VSHDNLQJ LQ
terms of broad constitutional JHQHUDOLWLHV ZLWK QR SUHWHQVH RI KLVWRULFDO VXSSRUW´27 He
UHDGLO\ DGPLWWHG WKDW RULJLQDOLVP¶V ³JUHDWHVW GHIHFW´ LV WKH ³GLIILFXOW\ RI DSSO\LQJ LW
FRUUHFWO\´FRQFHGLQJWKDWLWLV³D WDVNVRPHWLPHVEHWWHUVXLWHGWRWKHKLVWRULDQWKDQWKH
ODZ\HU´28 He furtheUFRQFHGHGWKDWWKHPHWKRGPD\EH³PHGLFLQHWKDWVHHPVWRRVWURQJ
WR VZDOORZ´ DEVHQW stare decisis and perhaps even with it, and that there is often little
GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH ³IDLQW-KHDUWHG RULJLQDOLVW DQG PRGHUDWH QRQRULJLQDOLVW´ LQ
practice.29 Although Scalia favored originalism because its chief weakness²the difficulty
of historical research²OHDGV³WRDPRUHPRGHUDWHUDWKHUWKDQDPRUHH[WUHPHUHVXOW´KH
FRQIHVVHGWKDWDWOHDVW³LQDFUXQFK´KHPD\³SURYHDIDLQW-KHDUWHGRULJLQDOLVW´30 Indeed,
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22. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695 (1976)
(bemoaning living constitutionalism as ³the substitution of some other set of values for those which may be
derived from the language and intent of the framers´).
23. Edwin Meese, III, U.S. Att¶y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47±54 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
24. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), in
ORIGINALISM, supra note 23, at 55, 58 (³One cannot help but speculate that the chorus of lamentations calling
for interpretation faithful to µoriginal intention¶ . . . must invariably come from persons who have no familiarity
with the historical record.´). The most important article out of the academy regarding originalism that year argued
that it did not matter because the Founders did not intend for future generations to seek to discern their intent. H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 885 (1985). But see
Jack Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 159, 160±61 (1996)
(describing extensive and serious criticism of Powell¶s conclusions). For a more detailed near-contemporaneous
summary of the academic debate, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
25. Edwin Meese, III, U.S. Att¶y Gen., Speech Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers
Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 23, at 71, 74±75.
26. Id. at 76.
27. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989).
28. Id. Scalia commended an opinion by Chief Justice Taft that he saw as originalist, identified its gaps, and
cited sources that Taft could have used to fill them.
29. Id. at 861±62 (³It is, I think, the fact that most originalists are faint-hearted and most nonoriginalists are
moderate . . . which accounts for the fact that the sharp divergence between the two philosophies does not produce
an equivalently sharp divergence in judicial opinions.´). This difference between originalism-as-theory and
originalism-in-practice may be attributed to the fact that originalism-as-theory was largely as a force of political
reaction, while originalism-in-practice was largely in keeping with traditional approaches to judging (as
evidenced by, for example, Scalia¶s discussion of the Taft opinion). See infra Part VIII.
30. Id. at 864 (referring to his reluctance to uphold a statute that would impose flogging as a punishment even
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even though he later professed to have abandoned such faint-heartedness,31 it is this
YHUVLRQRIRULJLQDOLVPGULYLQJ6FDOLD¶V)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWMXULVSUXGHQFH
B. Critiques: Recognizing History’s Limits
7KRXJK -XVWLFH 6FDOLD UHDGLO\ DGPLWV WKH ³GLIILFXOW\´ RI RULginalism, the most
familiar critique of the theory is that its proponents elide the difficulty of neutral, honest
application. Recognition of its limits, however, has strengthened its appeal. Over the past
twenty years, a consensus has begun to emerge that, at least in some sense, we are all
originalists.
%\KLVWRULDQ-DFN5DNRYHQRWHGWKDW³WKHWXUQWRRULJLQDOLVPVHHPVVRJHQHUDO
WKDW FLWDWLRQ LV DOPRVW EHVLGH WKH SRLQW´ 32 :KLOH 5DNRYH UHMHFWHG WKH LGHD ³WKDW WKH
decisions of 1787-88 embedded a particular set of binding meanings into the fabric of the
&RQVWLWXWLRQ´33 KHUHDGLO\DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWRULJLQDOLVPFRXOGKHOSZLWK³QDUURZLQJDQG
UDQNLQJWKHDYDLODEOHUDQJHRIPHDQLQJV´DQG³GHPRQVWUDWLQJWKHVKHHULPSODXVLELOLW\RI
particularly egregious misUHDGLQJV´ RI WH[W34 Similarly, in 1999, natural law theorist
5DQG\%DUQHWW ZURWHWKDWFRQWUDU\WR³WKHUHFHLYHG ZLVGRPDPRQJODZSURIHVVRUVWKDW
RULJLQDOLVPLVGHDG´LW³KDVQRWRQO\VXUYLYHGWKHGHEDWHRIWKHHLJKWLHVEXWLWKDVYLUWXDOO\
triumphed oveULWVULYDOV´DWOHDVWWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWLWFRXOGOLPLWWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDQ
DPELJXRXVRUXQGHUGHWHUPLQDWHWH[WWR³WKHERXQGVHVWDEOLVKHGE\RULJLQDOPHDQLQJ´ 35
$QG LQ  .HLWK :KLWWLQJWRQ DUJXHG WKDW RULJLQDOLVP FDQ ³SRLQW LQWHUSUHWHUV WR WKH
corrHFWIRUPVRIHYLGHQFHDQGDUJXPHQWDWLRQ´DQGVXJJHVWVD³SURSHU´ PRUHOLPLWHG UROH
for the judiciary.36 Finally²and most relevant here²Bernadette Meyler in 2006
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if there was evidence it was neither cruel nor unusual in the Founding era).
31. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 4, 2013), http://
nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ (³I described myself as that a long time ago. I repudiate
that. . . . I try to be an honest originalist! I will take the bitter with the sweet!´).
32. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to it), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1592 n.14 (1997).
33. Id. at 1609 (³As a theory of fidelity through history, originalism ultimately fails because it is false to the
history it purports to describe.´).
34. Id. at 1589 (citing as one example how historians can explain why Justice Scalia was mistaken to rely on
the Declaration of Rights of Massachusetts of 1780 as evidence of how the 1787 drafters of the Constitution felt
about the separation of powers). Other historians have similarly noted that lawyer¶s history is inherently
limited²given constraints of time, resources, and expertise, not to mention the limits of historical sources, courts
cannot be expected to produce history with sufficient rigor to justify the claim that originalism is a neutral
approach to the law. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 296 (2011) (arguing
that public meaning originalism has not solved the problem of the absence of rigorous historical work in the
movement); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1708 (examining the
differences between ³lawyer¶s histories´ and ³history´).
35. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611±13, 645 (1999) (arguing
that originalism is ³now the prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation´ even though no one had written
³a definitive formulation´ of the theory).
36. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL¶Y 599, 611 (2004). To Whittington,
this was particularly important in light of the ³passage´ of the ³old originalism´ to a ³new´ 1990s version that
was ³more comprehensive and substantive´ than the old²and less inclined to judicial restraint (a shift that can
be seen in Scalia¶s rhetorical abandonment of his own faint-heartedness). Id. at 603±06, 608±10. This ³new´
originalism focused on original public meaning rather than original intent. The vigorous debate over whether this
approach does justice to history continues. Compare Jonathan Gienapp, Constitutional Originalism and History,
PROCESS (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.processhistory.org/originalism-history/, and Jonathan Gienapp, Knowing
How vs. Knowing That: Navigating the Past, PROCESS, (Apr. 4, 2017), with Randy Barnett, Challenging the
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DGYRFDWHG ³FRPPRQ ODZ RULJLQDOLVP´ WR XQLI\ GLVSDUDWH VWUDQGV RI HLJKWHHQWK-century
common law on both sides of the Atlantic.37 :KLOHRULJLQDOLVWVRIWHQDFWDVLI%ODFNVWRQH¶V
Commentaries was a comprehensive Founding-era summary of a single, universal body of
common law,38 the field was dramatically in flux at the time. 39 Meyler thus proposed
abandonLQJ DQ RULJLQDOLVP ³IL[DWHG XSRQ SDUWLcular, decontextualized answers´40 and
LQVWHDG XVLQJ WKH FRPPRQ ODZ WR ³SURYLGH WKH SDUDPHWHUV IRU GHEDWHV DERXW SDUWLFXODU
constitutional concepts, debates whose contours may shift over time, like the common law
itself´41
Synthesizing these ideas leads to the concept of incremental originalism. This
approach readily admits that interpretation requires judgment, but uses history²including
original intent and original public meaning²to set the boundaries of debate. Willingness
to create exceptions and admit limits is not the same as abandonment of principle.
Incrementalism is the foundation of stare decisis, a principle that Scalia admitted iV ³D
pragmatic exception´ WR KLV SKLORVRSK\42 that ensures originalism will not result in a
³ZUHQFKLQJ SXUJH´ RI WKH &RXUW¶V SUHFHGHQWV 7KLV $UWLFOH ZLOO VKRZ WKDW LQFUHPHQWDO
originalism is the approach that Scalia took in his Fourth Amendment jurisprudence²
FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VWUDGLWLRQDODSSURDFK
II. THE FOUNDERS¶ FOURTH AMENDMENT
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Priesthood of Professional Historians, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/28/challenging-the-priesthood-ofprofessional-historians/.
37. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 551 (2006) (arguing
the common law should ³supply[] the terms of a debate about certain concepts, framing questions for judges but
refusing them to settle them definitively´).
38. Id. at 560±61.
39. Id. at 567±72. The Founders themselves disputed both the importance and content of the common law
and distinguished the American and English traditions. Id. Meyler saw this not as a reason to attack originalism,
³but rather [to] encourage its metamorphosis into a more dynamic creature, one with appeal to both originalists
and living constitutionalists.´ Id. at 552.
40. Id. at 593.
41. Id. at 600.
42. SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 140 (writing in response to Lawrence Tribe¶s
critique of his use of stare decisis); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 411±14 (2012).
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A cursory review of research done by legal historians, let alone a careful examination
of Founding-era primary sources, reveals that the original intent and original public
meaning of the Fourth Amendment are incredibly difficult to discern with sufficient
certainty to justify any firm conclusions about how the Founders would have decided a
particular case. This Part conducts just such a cursory review of that research, from the
common law antecedents in the decades leading up to the American Revolution through
the drafting and ratification of state constitutions and the federal Constitution to the
drafting and ratification of the Fourth Amendment. It relies in particular on the
monumental work of William J. Cuddihy, whose dissertation Justice Sandra Day
2¶&RQQRU FDOOHG ³RQH RI WKH PRVW H[KDXVWLYH DQDO\VHV RI WKH RULJLQDO PHDQLQJ RI WKH
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)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWHYHUXQGHUWDNHQ´43 Yet even his work leaves questions unanswered.44
As such, this Part shows that, if any conclusion may be drawn from study of the history of
the context, drafting, and ratification of the Fourth Amendment, it is that the Founders
cared most about the broad principle the Supreme Court has repeatedly cited: government
intrusion must be carefully limited and regulated.
A. Transatlantic Common Law
To understand the context from which the Fourth Amendment emerged, one must
begin with the long path toward revolution. Conventional accounts begin with the growing
hostility toward general warrants45 on each side of the Atlantic in the years leading up to
1776 and conclude with ratification of the Fourth Amendment. 46
1. The Colonies
For the first half of the eighteenth century, an array of laws allowed search and
seizure in the colonies either without a warrant or, at most, with a general warrant.47
Warrantless searches and seizures were nonetheless rare. 48 Customs searches were most
FRPPRQDQGWKH³VXEVWDQWLDOYLROHQFH´RIJHQHUDOVHDUFKHV³EUHGLQWHQVHUHVHQWPHQW´LQ
the colonies.49 Massachusetts, a hotbed of resistance to searches, became the first colony
to require specific warrants for many types of searches in 1756. That requirement was
FDWDO\]HGE\SRSXODUFRQFHUQVWKDW3DUOLDPHQW¶V([FLVH$FWRIZKLFKDOORZHGWD[
collectors to question citizens about their consumption of spirits, would lead collectors to
search their homes as well. 50 Privacy as much as physical safety thus motivated public
opposition.51
But it was in 1761 that agitation in the colonies over general warrants came to a head
with the Massachusetts controversy over writs of assistance. These writs were issued by a
court to validate the authority of customs officers to conduct searches at will but were
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43. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669±71 (1995) (O¶Connor, J., dissenting) (conducting
an originalist analysis of individualized suspicion). Curiously, the Court¶s opinion, which looked to
reasonableness, was written by Justice Scalia. Id. at 652±57.
44. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 571 (1999).
45. In contrast to modern particularized warrants, general warrants allowed government officials to search
any number of houses and persons for potentially incriminating evidence.
46. See generally WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING,
602±1791 (2009); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L.
REV. 361, 362±66 (1921).
47. Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925,
939±41 (1997).
48. Thomas K. Clancy, The Importance of James Otis, 82 MISS. L.J. 487, 491 (2013). They were particularly
rare relative to England: ³New England had only about half as many statutory categories of promiscuous search
and seizure as had old England,´ and that region had more than the remainder of the colonies. CUDDIHY, supra
note 46, at 228.
49. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 253. For instance, in 1728, a customs officer and his men ³twice went on a
rampage of searches´ of houses, warehouses, and ships, seizing contraband and non-contraband alike and
threatening to shoot citizens in the process. Id. at 358.
50. Maclin, supra note 47, at 943±44.
51. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 356±57.
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time-limited by the death of the sovereign.52 Thus, when George II died in 1760, customs
officials were required to apply for new writs²DQGLQDQDFWLRQNQRZQDV3D[WRQ¶V&DVH
James Otis petitioned the Massachusetts Superior Court to deny them on the ground that
general warrants were unconstitutional and only specific warrants were allowed. 53 Otis
complained that the writs made a citizen ³WKHVHUYDQWRIVHUYDQWV´LQKLVRZQKRPH54 The
FRXUW¶V FKLHI MXVWLFH VRXJKW LQIRUPDWLRQ DEout use of the writs in England and, upon
OHDUQLQJWKH\ ZHUH XVHGWKHUH³MXGJHG>LW@ VXIILFLHQWWR ZDUUDQWWKH OLNHSUDFWLFHLQ WKH
SURYLQFH´55 Although Otis lost, his arguments energized the public such that he
successfully pushed the Massachusetts legislature to pass a bill (which was controversially
vetoed) requiring particularized warrants in many circumstances, 56 and colonial courts
began to decline granting writs of assistance.57
-RKQ$GDPVODWHUGUDPDWLFDOO\UHFDOOHGWKHGLVSXWHDV³WKHILUVWVFHQHRIWKHILUVWDFW
of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there, the Child
,QGHSHQGHQFHZDVERUQ´58 But even if it catalyzed the path to revolution, it did not directly
inform the text of the Fourth Amendment. The case was mentioned only once in the
debates over the Constitution and Bill of Rights.59 Nonetheless, it was clearly part of a
developing consensus against general warrants motivated by the politics of the time, a
dramatic increase in the types and number of searches and seizures, and the violence
accompanying them.60
2. England
Contemporaneously, a series of trespass cases brought by John Wilkes and his
supporters served as the locus of opposition to general warrants in England. Fragmentary
opposition to general warrants dated back centuries but crystalized into categorical outrage
DERXWWKH&URZQ¶VXVHRIWKHPWRLQYHVWLJDWHDQGSURVHFXWHWKHDXWKRUVDQGSXEOLVKHUVRI
alleged political libels.61 Wilkes was a member of parliament and publisher of a satirical
newspaper whose attacks on George III earned him a charge of seditious libel in 1763.62
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52. Maclin, supra note 47, at 945.
53. Id. at 946. See also Davies, supra note 44, at 561. Otis had been the chief attorney of Massachusetts and
resigned his office for the purpose of attacking the writs on behalf of Boston merchants. The merchants may have
had additional reasons for opposing the writ beyond the principle of liberty, given the legal device was designed
to fight smuggling. See CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 381, 397.
54. Davies, supra note 44, at 578.
55. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J.
979, 993 (2011) (quoting THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY,
FROM 1749 TO 1774, 93±94 (1828)).
56. Maclin, supra note 47, at 946±47.
57. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 513±26, 533±36.
58. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 244, 248
(Little Brown and Co. ed., 1846).
59. Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
53, 76 (1996) (noting that Adams was writing with the benefit of more than a half-century of hindsight); see also
Clancy, Intent, supra note 55, at 1011 (noting that mention of the English cases discussed below is notably absent
from Adams¶ writing).
60. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 569.
61. Id. at 439±40.
62. Davies, supra note 44, at 562.
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The search for evidence was widespread and violent, including seizure of the entirety of
:LONHV¶VSapers.63 In response, Wilkes sued the government officials who conducted the
searches for trespass.64 The general warrant authorizing the search was rejected by the
court as defense against the tort.65
Soon thereafter, in 1765, came the case that would become the best known in the
colonies, Entick v. Carrington.66 That case also dealt with a search for evidence in support
of a seditious libel charge.67 /RUG&DPGHQ¶VRSLQLRQLQWKHFDVHZKLFKVLPLODUO\UHMHFWHG
the legality of general warrants for searches of this nature, focused on property: because
³RXUODZKROGVWKHSURSHUW\RIHYHU\PDQVRVDFUHGWKDWQRPDQFDQVHWKLVIRRWXSRQKLV
QHLJKERXU¶VFORVHZLWKRXWKLVOHDYH´DQG³SDSHUVDUHRIWHQWKHGHDUHVWSURSHUW\DPDQFDQ
KDYH´DJHQHUDO ZDUUDQWWRVHDUFK KLVKRXVH DQGSDSHUV³LV ZKROO\LOOHJDODQGYRLG´68
Despite this strong language, Entick was limited to searches aimed at censorship of the
press.69
Although full case reports of Entick and the other Wilkes cases were not published
in the colonies until later, a Blackstone summary of the developments and other news
UHSRUWVDERXWWKHFDVHVFRLQFLGHGZLWK3DUOLDPHQW¶VSDVVDJHRIWKH7RZQVKHQG$FWLQ
which reauthorized the general writ for customs searches. 70 That combination proved
highly inflammatory, and a consensus against general warrants among colonial judges
developed.71 The controversy bubbled on into the Revolution.
B. Revolutionary State Constitutions
While there is relative consensus among legal historians about the slights that led
the Founders to focus attention on the issue of search and seizure, there is considerable
dispute about what they intended the Fourth Amendment to do about it²in large part
because there is insufficient evidence available to justify strong conclusions. Many of
these disputes focus on whether there is a warrant requirement or broad reasonableness
standard and are therefore outside the scope of this Article.72 Of interest here is the
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63. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 441±43 (describing searches in the dead of night, seizure of all the papers of
several individuals, and forty-nine arrests).
64. Wilkes v. Wood, [1763] 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
65. Id. at 498±99.
66. [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
67. Id. at 807±08.
68. Id. at 817±18. The Founders seemingly neglected to note the opinion¶s conclusion: the court nonetheless
stands against libel, and that laws against it must be enforced, for ³tyranny is worse than anarchy, and the worst
Government better than none at all.´ Id. at 818.
69. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 455±58.
70. Davies, supra note 44, at 563±64. Highlighting the transatlantic nature of the controversies, James Otis
in 1765 cited Blackstone¶s earlier description in the Commentaries of the three key rights of Englishmen as being
³the free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property. Clancy, Otis, supra note
48, at 498 (citing James Otis, A Vindication of the British Colonies (1765), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 558 (Bernard Bailyn, ed. 1965)).
71. Davies, supra note 44, at 566.
72. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (arguing
that the warrant clause does not impose a warrant requirement, but only prohibits general warrants, a position
often called ³generalized reasonableness´ construction); Maclin, supra note 47, at 955 (arguing that Amar¶s
interpretation unjustly reduces the scope of the reasonableness clause, the more common ³warrant preference´
construction).
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DGGLWLRQRIWKHHQXPHUDWHG³SHUVRQVKRXVHVSDSHUVDQGHIIHFWV´SURSHUW\FODXVHVLQFH
that language is at the center of the line of Justice Scalia opinions that created the modern
³SURSHUW\-SOXV´VWDQGDUG73
The first appearance of the enumerated property clause was in the 1776
Pennsylvania declaration of rights, which introduced its prohibition on general warrants
ZLWK UHIHUHQFH WR WKH SHRSOH¶V ³ULJKW WR KROG WKHPVHOYHV WKHLU KRXVHV SDSHUV DQG
SRVVHVVLRQVIUHHIURPVHDUFKRUVHL]XUH´74 Enumeration served both to link the right to
the property interests paramount under common law and to functionally limit the places
where the right exists.75 Similar language appeared in the 1780 Massachusetts
FRQVWLWXWLRQZKLFKJXDUDQWHHGWKH³ULJKWWREHVHFXUHIURPDOOXQUHDVRQDEOHVHDUFKHVDQG
seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his pRVVHVVLRQV´76 and the 1783 New
Hampshire constitution copied that clause verbatim. 77 That text, drafted by none other
WKDQ-RKQ$GDPVH[SDQGHGWKHLQWURGXFWRU\FODXVHWRLQFOXGHWKHFRQFHSWVRI³VHFXUH´
DQG³XQUHDVRQDEOH´78
Similar language was debated by the Continental Congress as it considered whether
and how to forward the draft Constitution to the states for ratification. Henry Richard Lee
of Virginia proposed Congress send a bill of rights, including a provision written in
language borrowed from AdamsDJXDUDQWHHWKDW³WKH&LWL]HQVVKDOOQRWEHH[SRVHGWR
XQUHDVRQDEOH VHDUFKHV VHL]XUH RI WKHLU SHUVRQV KRXVHV SDSHUV RU SURSHUW\´ 79 The
language appeared repeatedly after the federal Constitution was drafted and published for
ratification as part of the broader debate between Federalists and Antifederalists as to
whether it was a good idea to include an enumerated list of the common law rights that the
Constitution would preserve.80
Antifederalist writers widely decried the fact that the draft Constitution lacked an
explicit prohibition on general warrants in language similar to the state declarations of
rights, including the enumeration of places to be protected.81 Even an Antifederalist
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73. See infra Part VI.D±F. However, the fact that neither Cuddihy nor any of the other authors cited herein
discuss why these specific enumerated places were chosen suggests that the reasons may well be unknowable,
itself a statement as to history¶s limits.
74. Pa. Const. of 1776, art. X (Decl. of Rights).
75. Davies, supra note 44, at 680±81.
76. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV.
77. N.H. Const. of 1783, pt. 1, art. XIX.
78. Clancy, Intent, supra note 55, at 1028.
79. Id. at 1030, 1030 n.336.
80. See CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 673 & nn.13±14.
81. See, e.g., Centinel [Samuel Bryan], Centinel I, Indep. Gazetter (Phila.), October 5, 1787, reprinted in THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, PART ONE: SEPTEMBER 1787 TO FEBRUARY 1788, at 52, 52±53
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (arguing that citizens will determine with their vote on ratification ³whether your
houses shall continue to be your castles; whether your papers, your persons and your property, are to be held
sacred and free from general warrants´); Centinel [Samuel Bryan], Centinel II, Freeman¶s J. (Phila.), October
24, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, at 77, 89 (complaining the Constitution
lacks a declaration ³[t]hat the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and possessions free
from search or seizure,´ and that general warrants are ³contrary to that right and ought not to be granted´); The
Federal Farmer, Letter IV, October 12, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, 274,
279 (essential rights include the ³freedom from hasty and unreasonable search warrants, warrants not founded
on oath, and not issued with due caution, for searching and seizing men¶s papers, property, and persons´); A
Columbian Patriot [Mercy Otis Warren], Observations on the Constitution, February 1788, reprinted in THE
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argument stressing the importance of trial by jury raised general warrant searches as part
of a parade of horribles that could be avoided through a jury trial guarantee²and did so
in a way that graphically focused on the violence as well as the invasiveness of searches.82
In sum, these complaints were hodgepodge but broad, rendering it difficult to draw
conclusions about intent or even public understanding in the era.
Antifederalist grievances in turn duly made their way into the ratification convention
debates.83 First, in Pennsylvania, the minority dissent noted that general warrants are
³JULHYRXVDQGRSSUHVVLYH´ 84 And in New York, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina,
ratification conventions passed a list of proposed amendments to the Constitution that each
included a two-clause formulation, first expressing the right to be free from searches of
persons and property, and second prohibiting the issuance of general warrants in violation
of that right.85
C. The Bill of Rights
The Antifederalist push for an enumerated Bill of Rights led the First Congress to
consider a series of amendments to the Constitution, drafted by James Madison with an
aim toward bringing moderate Antifederalists on board. 86 0DGLVRQ¶V GUDIW )RXUWK
Amendment merged the two-clause form of the state declarations of rights and most of the
ratifying convention proposals into a single clause that focused on the general warrant
prohibition²though it still included the enumerated property list. 87 It is noteworthy that
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DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, PART TWO: JANUARY TO AUGUST 1788, at 284, 293 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1993) (citing specifically and exclusively in a general complaint about the lack of a Bill of Rights
³the insecurity in which we are left with regard to warrants unsupported by evidence,´ which could lead to ³the
insolence of any petty revenue officer to enter our houses, search, insult, and seize at pleasure´). See generally
CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 673±80.
82. A Democratic Federalist, Reply to Wilson’s Speech, PENN. HERALD (Phila.), October 17, 1787, reprinted
in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, supra note 81, at 70, 73±74 (³Suppose . . . that a constable,
having a warrant to search for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a woman, and
searched under her shift . . . in such cases a trial by jury would be our safest resource.´).
83. See generally CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 680±86.
84. Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, PENN. PACKET (Phila.), December 18, 1787,
reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, supra note 81, at 526, 533.
85. Ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of the State of New York, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION PART TWO, supra note 81, at 536, 538 (declaring the ³right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seizures of his person, his papers or his property´ and that general warrants are ³grievous and
oppressive´ and therefore should not be granted); Proposed Amendments by the Convention of the Delegates of
the People of the State of Maryland, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART TWO, supra note 81,
at 552, 554 (proposing an amendment to declare that general warrants ³to search suspected places, or to seize any
person, or his property, are grievous and oppressive . . . and ought not to be granted); Ratification Agreed to by
the Convention of Virginia, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART TWO, supra note 81, at 557,
560 (proposing an amendment to declare that ³every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches, and seizures of his person, his papers, and property,´ and general warrants are dangerous and ought not
to be granted); Declaration of Rights of the Convention of the State of North Carolina, reprinted in THE DEBATE
ON THE CONSTITUTION PART TWO, supra note 81, at 565, 567 (declaring that ³every freeman has a right to be
secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his papers, and his property´ and general
warrants are dangerous and ought not to be granted).
86. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 704±12 (describing Madison¶s plan to drive a wedge between ³hard-core
Antifederalists´ who sought to revise the Constitution into something more like the Articles of Confederation
and moderates genuinely concerned about the lack of enumerated rights).
87. Davies, supra note 44, at 697 (³The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their
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papers, and their other property from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants
issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be
searched, or the persons or things to be seized.´).
88. See id. at 706±15 (arguing the change was so intended).
89. Id. at 716±24 (arguing that the Founders ³adopted the text as a specific response to a specific grievance
[the general warrant] that had arisen in a specific historical context and had been shaped by a specific
vulnerability in the protections afforded by common-law arrest and search authority´). But see Tracey Maclin,
The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 209 (1993) (³The changes to
Madison¶s draft escaped the notice of members of the House and Senate, and the altered provision was approved
by Congress and ratified by the state constitutional conventions without extensive discussion regarding the
precise language of what later became the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.´).
90. CUDDIHY supra note 46, at 712±24.
91. Id. at 725±26 (³Without the political urgency that Antifederalism imposed, Madison would not have
written a right forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures.´).
92. Id. at 670, 770.
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0DGLVRQ¶V GUDIW XVHG WKH ZRUG ³SURSHUW\´ ZKLFK DSSHDUHG UHSHDWHGO\ LQ $QWLIHGHUDOLVW
writing, raWKHU WKDQ ³HIIHFWV´ ZKLFK ZDV VXEVWLWXWHG ODWHU E\ WKH +RXVH¶V GUDIWLQJ
Committee of Eleven²perhaps in an attempt to ensure the amendment did not enshrine
an unlimited right.88 $+RXVHIORRUDPHQGPHQWFKDQJLQJWKHSURSRVDOIURP0DGLVRQ¶V
draft into the two-clause form we know today is responsible for the aforementioned
academic dispute over whether the amendment imposes a warrant requirement or a broad
reasonableness standard.89 Ratification by the states came relatively quickly as the
Antifederalist coalition broke down.90
***
7KHGLVSDUDWHYLHZSRLQWVRIDFDGHPLFVUHYHDOKRZGLIILFXOWLWLVWRSLQGRZQD³WUXH´
original meaning of²or even an original intent for²the Fourth Amendment. Beyond a
broad consensus that the Founders near-universally opposed general warrants and meant
to prohibit them, it is unclear whether the Amendment was also meant to require warrants
LQ YLUWXDOO\ DOO LQVWDQFHV RU PHUHO\ WR DYRLG ³XQUHDVRQDEOH´ VHDUFKHV DQG VHL]XUHV²
whatever those might be. It is similarly murky whether the enumerated property clause
was intended merely to tie the Amendment to the property interests paramount in common
law or was also meant to draw limits around what rights it protected. What is clear,
however, is that Antifederalist opposition to the Constitution led directly to the
$PHQGPHQW¶VGUDIWLQJDQGUDWLILFDWLRQ²even if it did not as directly inform its content.91
To the extent that ratification of the Constitution was conditioned on enumerating the
common law rights to be preserved, historical inquiry into the common law antecedents of
the Fourth Amendment is essential to developing an originalist understanding of the right.
&XGGLK\ QRWHV WKDW ³WKH )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW H[SUHVVHG LGHDV WKDW KDG EHHQ
GHYHORSLQJIRUFHQWXULHV´D³IDPLO\RILGHDVZKRVHLGHQWLW\DQd dimensions developed in
KLVWRULFDOFRQWH[W´92 The most important takeaway from this review of literature is that
the project is too vast, and sources too sparse, for legal historians²let alone lawyers or
the Court²to draw firm conclusions about the original intent of the Founders or the
RULJLQDOPHDQLQJRIWKHDPHQGPHQW7KDWLQWXUQFDOOVLQWRTXHVWLRQWKH&RXUW¶VFODLPVWR
doing so.
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sometimes treateGDVRQHFRQWLQXRXVHUDRIOHJDOIRUPDOLVPLWLVQRWWUXHWKDWWKH&RXUW¶V
decisions in the 170 or so years prior to the realist revolution took an identical approach to
Fourth Amendment law. For most of the nineteenth century and even the first decades of
the twentieth, the Court²aiming to avoid erosion of the underlying common law right²
took a traditionalist approach that is not that dissimilar from what Justice Scalia suggested
ZDV ³IDLQWKHDUWHG RULJLQDOLVP´ 7KLV 3DUW ORRNV WKURXJK WKUHH VHPLQDO FDVHV²Boyd v.
United States, Weeks v. United States, and Gouled v. United States²that sketched the
outlines of Fourth Amendment doctrine and served as a model of how the Court would
use history in key Fourth Amendment cases going forward.
A. Boyd v. United States (1886)
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93. The Court¶s first Fourth Amendment case came a decade earlier, but it was decided based on Congress¶s
power to regulate the mails. See Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); see also infra note 129.
94. 116 U.S. 616, 617í18, 622 (1886). In modern terms, the question is whether a subpoena for papers
proving possession of contraband violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when search and seizure of the
contraband itself does not.
95. Id. at 622. Contraband itself is different because the government, not the defendant, ³is entitled to
possession of the property´ at issue. Id. at 623. The same is true with regard to stolen goods, possession to which
the victim of the crime is entitled. Id. at 625. Boyd thus formed the basis for the ³mere evidence´ doctrine that
reached its apogee in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and was overturned in Warden, Md.
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (describing the rule as distinguishing search and seizure of ³items
of evidential value only´ from search and seizure of ³instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband´). See infra note 138
and accompanying text.
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7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VVHPLQDO)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWGHFLVLRQGLGQRWFRPHXQWLO
more than a century after ratification. 93 From the beginning, then, the Court sought
answers in history²and its effort in this regard remains to this day its most exhaustive. In
Boyd v. United States, the Court answered the question whether an 1874 statute authorizing
the search and seizure (or compulsory production) of private papers (customs invoices)
violates the Fourth Amendment even though search and seizure of the contraband property
itself (thirty-five cases of plate glass) did not.94 In making its decision, the Court applied
two classical interpretive maxims: consuetudo est optimus interpres legume (custom is the
best interpreter of the law) and contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege
(contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law). The Court concluded that
QHLWKHU ³ORQJ XVDJH´ QRU ³FRQWHPSRUDU\ FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ´ MXVWLILHG WKH
statute: the government is entitled to possession of stolen or forfeited goods or contraband
JRRGVKLGGHQIURPFXVWRPVGXWLHVEXWQRWWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSDSHUV 95
:KLOH WKH /DWLQ H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKH &RXUW¶V LQWHUSUHWLYH PHWKRGV LV REVFXUH WRGD\
both maxims are recognizable in principle. The first is in keeping with the traditions of
common law judging and the second more or less analogous to original public meaning
textualism. The majority in Boyd worked through both methods simultaneously,
consulting sources from the then-recent past to determine what insight they could offer in
either regard. This makes sense; given the recency of the sources consulted, even the
FRPPRQ ODZ DSSURDFK ZDV VRPHZKDW DQDORJRXV WR WRGD\¶V RULJLQDO PHDQLQJ RU LQWHQW
originalism. To the Boyd Court, English and American common law antecedents both
directly informed the original public meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the two
interpretative maxims thus worked in tandem to create a cohesive common law originalist
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96. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623 & n.3.
97. Id. at 623±29.
98. Id. at 623. The Court also looked to the Judiciary Act of 1789 to bolster the conclusion that the First
Congress believed that courts must determine when an individual would be forced to produce incriminating
evidence, rather than allowing warrantless searches. Id. at 630±31. See also CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at lxvii
(³The exclusion of most Congressional debates and other data beyond 1791 is intentional because such
documentation reveals far less about what the amendment originally meant than about what it came to mean in
the partisan blast furnace of the 1790s.´).
99. See, e.g., infra notes 156í158 and accompanying text.
100. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 43 (regulating collection of the duties imposed by law on tonnage of
ships or vessels and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into the United States).
101. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623í24.
102. Id. at 624.
103. See id. (citing Massachusetts v. Dana, 2 Met. 329 (Mass. 1841)).
104. Id. at 624.
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analysis.
Although the Court did not often differentiate between the types of sources it used
in conducting its historical analysis, they may be grouped into three distinct types: preRevolutionary English common law, colonial American law, and Founding-era legislation.
While each of these sources is distinctive in terms of governmental structure, cultural
assumptions, and other contexts, the fact that the Court blended the three into a cohesive
analysis (the same way it conflated its two interpretive maxims) suggests that each was
seen as an outgrowth of the one prior, daWLQJEDFNWRWKHSURYHUELDO³WLPHLPPHPRULDO´
This conclusion is strengthened by the order in which the Boyd Court proceeded with its
analysis. The Court began by noting that even the colonial writs of assistance did not go
as far as did the 1863 law at issue in the case, in stark contrast to the more limited searches
long allowed by English statutes and common law. 96 It then began its in-depth analysis
with the customs statute passed by the First Congress, turned to the colonial writs of
assurance controversy, and finally examined the near-contemporaneous developments in
English common law that informed that colonial reaction.97
7KHRSLQLRQ¶VTXDVLRULJLQDOLVWDQDO\VLVEHJDQZLWKWKHFRXQWU\¶VILUVWFXVWRPVODZ
which the Court gave great interpretive credibiOLW\EHFDXVHWKHODZZDV³SDVVHGE\
the same congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the
FRQVWLWXWLRQ´98 The historical rigor underlying that selection is commendable; later
opinions would, by contrast, muddle together decades worth of sources as
³FRQWHPSRUDQHRXV´ ZLWK WKH )RXQGLQJ99 Sections 23 through 26 of the 1789 statute
DOORZHGFXVWRPVRIILFHUVRQPHUH³VXVSLFLRQRIIUDXG´WRRSHQDQGH[DPLQHSDFNDJHV
enter and search ships and vessels, and seize contraband.100 To the Boyd Court, that was
SURRI WKDW WKHVH DFWLRQV ZHUH QRW ³XQUHDVRQDEOH´ WR WKH ERG\ WKDW GUDIWHG WKH )RXUWK
Amendment.101 The Court noted that other contraband, like excisable goods (searchable
E\ UHYHQXH RIILFHUV  XQODZIXO REMHFWV RU ³VHFUHWHG SURSHUW\ RU FUHGLWV´ WR VDWLVI\ D
judgment, may also be searched and seized without a warrant. 102 Highlighting how the
Court glided between history and common law, the Court made this move with just one
citation to an 1841 Massachusetts case on lottery tickets.103 After this litany, the Court
VWURQJO\GLVWLQJXLVKHGWKH³WRWDOXQOLNHQHVVRIWKHVHRIILFLDODFWVDQGSURFHHGLQJV´IURP
WKHODZZKLFK³DWWHPSWVWRH[WRUWIURPWKHSDUW\KLVSULYDWHERRNVDQGSDSHUV´ 104
7KH &RXUW QH[W WXUQHG WR ³WKH FRQWHPporary or then recent history of the
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105. See id. at 625; see also supra notes 91í92 and accompanying text.
106. See supra Part II.A.1.
107. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625±26 & n.4.
108. Although this may be attributable to Blackstone making the history of the English common law much
more readily available than colonial history, it could also be understood as a recognition that the Bill of Rights
was intended to incorporate the common law, not replace it. See supra Part II.C.
109. Boyd, 116 U.S at 625.
110. [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) (³The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their
property.´).
111. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626. Although this claim can today be easily documented, the Boyd Court made it
without citation²perhaps because, little more than a century after the Founding, it felt like living memory.
112. Id. at 627í28.
113. Id. at 628í29.
114. Id. at 629.
115. Id.
116. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627 (quoting Entick, [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807 (K.B.)).
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FRQWURYHUVLHV´ RYHU VHDUFKHV DQG VHL]XUHV ³ERWK LQ WKLV FRXQWU\ DQG LQ (QJODQG´
apparently to discern original intent²WKHVHDIWHUDOO³ZHUHIUHVKLQWKHPHPRULHVRIWKRVH
who achieved our independence and established RXUIRUPRIJRYHUQPHQW´105 The Court
began with a paragraph on the writs of assistance controversy. 106 It quoted James Otis
attacking the writs; cited the suits Otis brought against them, two treatises (one written by
a member of the Court), and the memoirs of John Adams; and echoed Adams in describing
WKHGHEDWHDV³SHUKDSVWKHPRVWSURPLQHQWHYHQWZKLFKLQDXJXUDWHGWKHUHVLVWDQFHRIWKH
FRORQLHVWRWKHRSSUHVVLRQVRIWKHPRWKHUFRXQWU\´ 107
Curiously, the Court looked much more closely at the English common law heritage
than the contemporaneous events in the colonies. 108 While describing an era that ran in
*UHDW%ULWDLQ³IURPZKHQWKH1RUWK%ULWRQZDVVWDUWHGE\-RKQ:LONHVWR$SULO
1766, when the house of commons passed resolutions condemnatory of general
ZDUUDQWV´109 the Court focused the overwhelming majority of its attention to Lord
&DPGHQ¶V  RSLQLRQ LQ Entick v. Carrington,110 UHDVRQLQJ WKDW ³HYHU\ $PHULFDQ
VWDWHVPDQ´LQWKH)RXQGLQJHUD³ZDVXQGRXEWHGO\IDPLOLDUZLWKWKLVPRQXPHQWRI(QJOLVK
freedoPDQGFRQVLGHUHGLWDVWKHWUXHDQGXOWLPDWHH[SUHVVLRQRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODZ´WKXV
³LWPD\EHFRQILGHQWO\DVVHUWHGWKDWLWVSURSRVLWLRQVZHUHLQWKHPLQGVRIWKRVHZKRIUDPHG
the fourth amendment to the constitution.´111 7KXVWKH&RXUWFKRVHWR³TXRWHVomewhat
ODUJHO\´WRWKHWXQHRIMXVWRYHUZRUGV7KHILUVWRUVRHVWDEOLVKWKDWDEVHQWD
ZULWWHQODZHPSRZHULQJDJHQWVRIWKHFURZQWRVHL]HDSHUVRQ¶VSDSHUVVXFKDQDFWLVD
YLRODWLRQ RI WKH RZQHU¶V SURSHUW\ ULJKW DQG WKXV D WUHVSDVV 112 The next 320 or so
distinguish the act of search and seizure from stolen goods from seizure of papers. 113
Following that is a roughly 235-word excerpt on the problem with compelling selfaccusation through compelled disclosure of papers (thus informing both the Fourth and
Fifth Amendment issues implicit in Boyd).114 The last forty-five words quoted are the
holding.115
Perhaps because the largest block of quoted text deals with the nature of property²
and includes the rather striking statement WKDW³>W@he great end for which men entered into
VRFLHW\ZDVWRVHFXUHWKHLUSURSHUW\´ Boyd is often treated as a decision about property
rights.116 Yet despite Lord Camden having given primacy of place to property rights, the
Boyd &RXUWOLPLWHGLWVRPHZKDW³,WLVQRWWKHEUHDNLQg of his doors, and the rummaging
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of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property . . . which
underlies and constitutes the essence oI/RUG&DPGHQ¶VMXGJPHQW´117 It was to avoid that
invasion that the Founders passed the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; as a result, they
ZRXOGKDYHUHMHFWHGWKHODZ³7KHVWUXJJOHVDJDLQVWDUELWUDU\SRZHULQZKLFKWKH\
had been engaged for more than 20 years would have been too deeply engraved in their
memories to have allowed them to approve of such insidious disguises of the old grievance
ZKLFKWKH\KDGVRGHHSO\DEKRUUHG´118
The Court concludes its analysis with a strong statement about the importance of
EHLQJ³ZDWFKIXO´IRU³VWHDOWK\HQFURDFKPHQWV´WKDWLVZRUWKTXRWLQJLQIXOO
It may be that [the subpoena power at issue] is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that
way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This
can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be
119
obsta principiis.

If the mere service of a notice to produce a paper to be used as evidence, which the party can
obey or not as he chooses, is a search, then a change has taken place in the meaning of words,
which has not come within my reading, and which I think was unknown at the time the
constitution was made.121

)RU0LOOHUWKH)RXQGHUV³RQO\LQWHQGHGWRUHVWUDLQWKHDEXVH´RISROLFHSRZHUDQGVRXJKW
only to aboOLVK JHQHUDO ZDUUDQWV LQWKH)RXUWK $PHQGPHQW³QRWDEROLVKWKH SRZHU´ WR
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117. Id. at 630. This statement neglects the reality that the physical violence inherent in colonial searches and
seizures was a large source of opposition to the general warrant. See, e.g., supra notes 49, 63 and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, what it gets right is the fact that Founding-era concerns were focused on privacy and security
at least as much as property.
118. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
119. Id. at 635 (emphasis added). The Court concludes its decision by running through conflicting opinions
below.
120. Id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 641.

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 43 Side A

In short, after its historical analysis, the Court proceeded to reason from the history
available to it, and in the process successfully captured the broad strokes of what the Fourth
Amendment was designed to do²protect person and property from invasive government
intrusion.
A concurrence in Boyd is worth brief discussion because it sharply diverges from
WKH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQE\WDNLQJDPRUHOLWHUDOLVWDSSURDFK:KLOH-XVWLFe Bradley wrote for
the Court about obsta principiis DQGWKHWKUHDWRI³VWHDOWK\HQFURDFKPHQWV´-XVWLFH0LOOHU
concurred that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination prohibited use of the
papers against the defendant, but wrote separately to express his view that no search nor
seizure had occurred.120 Sounding almost like Justice Scalia, he worried that:
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search altogether.122 His is a far more restrained reading of the common law antecedents
to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, making secondary the property concerns motivating
the Court 7KH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH &RXUW¶V UREXVW DSSURDFK IRFXVHG RQ DYRLGLQJ
HURVLRQ DQG0LOOHU¶VPRUHFUDEEHGUHDGLQJ PRYLQJWRZDUGOLWHUDOLVP EHFDPHFUXFLDOLQ
the decades to follow.
B. Weeks v. United States (1914)
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122. Id.
123. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914).
124. Id. at 393.
125. Id. at 398.
126. Id. at 390.
127. Id.
128. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
129. 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (³[A]ll regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination
to the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.´). In Ex Parte Jackson, the petitioner
was before the Court on a Habeas challenge to the constitutionality of a law prohibiting obscene material in the
mail on the originalist grounds that the power (and thus duty) to establish and regulate post offices and roads
means that ³a letter or a packet which was confessedly mailable matter at the time of the adoption of the
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The next seminal Fourth Amendment case came nearly three decades later, in 1914.
In Weeks v. United States, the Court answered the question whether papers seized by a
United States PDUVKDOLQDGHIHQGDQW¶VKRXVHZLWKRXWDZDUUDQWDQGZLWKRXWKLVFRQVHQW
may be used as evidence.123 7KH&RXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWLYHSULQFLSOHVHHPVWREHWKDWRIRULJLQDO
intent, which the Court discerned by running through the historical work done by Boyd
DQGWZRVXEVHTXHQWFDVHV,WFRQFOXGHGWKDWLIWKLVZHUHDOORZHG³WKHSURWHFWLRQ of the
4th Amendment . . . is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
DVZHOOEHVWULFNHQIURPWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ´124 Thus, the Court created the antecedent to the
modern-day exclusionary rule that prohibits prosecutors from evidence collected in
violation of a Fourth Amendment right. 125
Weeks PDUNVWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKH&RXUW¶VVKLIWDZD\IURPRULJLQDOKLVWRULFDOZRUN
to reliance on precedent. Unlike in Boyd, the Court did not elaborate interpretive
principles, but merely proceeds through precedent²albeit with an eye toward Foundingera history. Rather than turning to Boyd for its precedential value, it considered the history
³JLYHQZLWKSDUWLFXODULW\´LQWKDWFDVH³WKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHIUDPHUV´WRSURYLGHD%LOO
of Rights to secuUH ³WKRVH VDIHJXDUGV ZKLFKKDGJURZQXSLQ(QJODQG´DJDLQVWJHQHUDO
warrants.126 Citing contemporary treatises, the Court explained that resistance to the writs
RIDVVLVWDQFH³HVWDEOLVKHGWKHSULQFLSOHZKLFKZDVHQDFWHGLQWRWKHIXQGDPHQWDOODZLQWKH
4th AmHQGPHQWWKDWDPDQ¶VKRPHZDVKLVFDVWOH´127 Here we see a clearer focus on the
property-based rationale on which later decisions would explicitly rely, though the section
of Boyd quoted in Weeks LVWKHEURDGHUODQJXDJHRI³SHUVRQDOVHFXULW\SHUVRQDOOLEHrty,
DQGSULYDWHSURSHUW\´128
The Court also discussed two other cases. First, it mentioned Ex Parte Jackson, an
1877 case where the Court held that letters and packages may not be opened without a
warrant, despite the Constitutional power vested in Congress to establish post offices and
roads, because papers that have been closed against inspection are to be secure from search
and seizure wherever they may be located.129 The Court used Ex Parte Jackson to show
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WKDW³WKHSULQFLSOHRISURWHFWLRQ´JRHVEH\RQG³RQH¶VRZQKRXVHKROG´WRSURWHFWOHWWHUV
and sealed packages in the mail, suggesting that it is at pains to make clear that the
boundaries of the protection are not drawn by the property line of the aforementioned
castle.130
Second, the Weeks Court quoted from Bram v. United States, an 1897 case holding
WKDW D GHIHQGDQW¶V FRQIHVVLRQ ZDV LQYROXQWDU\ DQG YLRODWHG WKH )LIWK $PHQGPHQW²but
noting along the way, in discussing Boyd, that both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
contemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a constitutional provision,
principles of humanity and civil liberty which had been secured in the mother country only
after years of struggle, so as to implant them in our institutions in the fullness of their
integrity, free from the possibilities of future legislative change.131

This quotation was used (perhaps in part because Bram was authored by Justice Edward
White, who had, by the time of Weeks, become Chief Justice White) to affirm the intent
and principles underlying the Fourth Amendment.
It is this mix of history and precedent that the Court relied on to conclude that the
)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWLVRI³QRYDOXH´LILOOHJDOO\-seized papers were used as evidence²that
GRLQJVRZRXOG³VDFULILFH those great principles established by years of endeavor and
VXIIHULQJZKLFKKDYHUHVXOWHGLQWKHLUHPERGLPHQWLQWKHIXQGDPHQWDOODZRIWKHODQG´ 132
The Court then applied this principle to distinguish the chief cases put forward by the
government. In Adams v. New York, the Court had held that materials were admissible
because they were seized incidentally during an otherwise-legal search, a different
SURFHGXUDOSRVWXUHWKDW³DIIRUGVQRDXWKRULW\´ 133 In Hale v. Henkel, the Court had merely
held that subpoenas in general did not violate the Fourth Amendment²but the subpoena
DW LVVXH ZDV ³IDU WRR VZHHSLQJ LQ LWV WHUPV´ WR EH UHDVRQDEOH 7KXV ³D IRUWLRUL´ WKH
warrantless search in Weeks was unreasonable.134 These two cases each cited and
discussed Boyd, but, like Weeks, did so in a way that mixed Boyd¶VKLVWRULFDOZRUNZLWK
WKH&RXUW¶VRWKHUSUHFHGHQWV 135

09/18/2019 11:37:45

C M
Y K

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 44 Side A

Constitution cannot be excluded from them.´ Id. at 731. The Court rejected that argument, noting that there was
no evidence in the record as to how the evidence was collected, and therefore, ³the only question for our
determination relates to the constitutionality of the act; and of that we have no doubt.´ Id. at 737. This seems to
suggest the Court¶s statements on the First and Fourth Amendment were technically dicta. Not only did the Court
reject the petitioner¶s originalist argument, it did very little historical work: The statements about the Fourth
Amendment were based entirely in principle; related First Amendment commentary looked to an 1836 debate in
Congress but not to the Founding era. Id. at 733í34. That would have to wait for Boyd.
130. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 343 (quoting Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733).
131. 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897).
132. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
133. Id. at 394í96 (discussing Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904)).
134. Id. at 396í97 (discussing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 71±75 (1906)).
135. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 71í75 (citing Boyd, which ³exhaustively considered´ the construction of the Fourth
Amendment, and a series of subsequent cases for the premise that it ³was not intended to interfere with the power
of courts to compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, the production, upon a trial in court, of documentary
evidence´); Adams, 192 U.S. at 598 (citing Boyd, which ³elaborately considered´ the origin of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, and, without citations, ³the English, and nearly all of the American, cases´ for the premise
that the Amendments were ³designed to prevent violations of private security in person and property and
unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home,´ but ³were never intended to have [the] effect´ of prohibiting
evidence discovered incidentally during an otherwise legal ³search for the instruments of crime´ from being used
as evidence). Note that the latter case again recognized that Boyd focused on privacy and security at least as much
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While Weeks did not duplicate the primary source work of Boyd, it mirrored its goals
and approach: it self-consciously turned to Founding-era history to reach conclusions
about the principles and intent underlying the Fourth Amendment and apply them to the
modern-day question at issue. What sets it apart is that it was not the first of its kind; as
such, it has to consider precedent. Rather than opening with precedent and reasoning from
there, however, it began with history and only then turned to precedent to see if it conflicts.
C. Gouled v. United States (1921)
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as property.
136. 255 U.S. 298, 306í08 (1921). The Court also held that entry ³obtained by stealth instead of by force of
coercion´ invades the ³security and privacy of the home or office and of the papers of the owner´ just as much
and ³must therefore be regarded as equally in violation of his constitutional rights.´ Id. at 304í06. Again, note
the appearance of violence and privacy alongside property.
137. Id. at 303í04, 308í09 (citing Boyd, Weeks, and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920)). Silverthorne Lumber extended the exclusionary rule of Weeks to create the ³fruit of the poisonous tree´
doctrine without any resort to history; this would cut against an argument that cases in this era began with
Founding-era thoughts but for the fact that Weeks had just six years earlier done that work and this very short
opinion appears to take that for granted.
138. Id. at 309. Likewise, use of such evidence at trial violated the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Id. at 311. Even as Gouled provided the most clear articulation of the rule, countless exceptions
were already in place, see, e.g., Hale, 201 U.S. at 74í75 (holding that a corporation, as ³a creature of the state,´
is subject to ³a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded
its powers´; perhaps this was sufficient to give the government a property right in a corporation¶s books), and
many more proliferated after.
139. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 303í04.
140. Id. at 308.
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The final case in the traditionalist era meriting discussion came soon thereafter, in
1921. In Gouled v. United States, the Court answered the question whether a warrant may
DXWKRUL]HHQWU\LQWRDGHIHQGDQW¶VKRPHWRVHDUFKIRUPHUHHYLGHQFH KHUHWZRFRQWUDFWV
and an attorney bill allegedly related to the commission of a felony). 136 The Court began
both its opinion and the relevant section with the plain text of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, a look at how the Framers intended and viewed them, and how previous
Courts had acted. While the Court relied heavily on Boyd, its reasoning was focused on
the intent of the Founders, with common law precedent intermingled as a secondary
consideration.137 This case was the high-ZDWHU PDUN RI WKH ³PHUH HYLGHQFH´ GRFWULQH
XQGHUZKLFKZDUUDQWV³PD\QRWEHXVHGDVDPHDQVRIJDLQLQJDFFHVVWRDPDQ¶VKRXVHRU
office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used
DJDLQVWKLPLQDFULPLQDORUSHQDOSURFHHGLQJ´ 138
The Court in Gouled opened by stating that it would deal with the questions before
LWLQNHHSLQJZLWKWKH³VSLULW´RIWKH)UDPHUVDQGRIBoyd DQGWKH&RXUW¶VRWKHUGHFisions:
the idea WKDWWKH)RXUWKDQG)LIWK$PHQGPHQWV³VKRXOGUHFHLYHDOLEHUDOFRQVWUXFWLRQVR
DVWRSUHYHQWVWHDOWK\HQFURDFKPHQWXSRQRUµJUDGXDOGHSUHFLDWLRQ¶RIWKHULJKWVVHFXUHG
E\WKHP´139 In so doing, it returned to Boyd¶VWKHPHRIDYRLGLQJHURVLRn of the right. The
&RXUW WRRN D WH[WXDO RULJLQDOLVW¶V DSSURDFK LW ORRNHG WR ³WKH ZRUGLQJ RI WKH )RXUWK
$PHQGPHQW´ WR GLVFHUQ WKH IDFW WKDW ³WKH SHUPLVVLRQ RI WKH DPHQGPHQW KDV WKH VDPH
constitutional warrant as the prohibition [on unreasonable searches aQGVHL]XUHV@KDV´140
7KLV LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKH &RXUW VDLG ZDV ³DEXQGDQWO\ UHFRJQL]HG´ LQ Boyd and Weeks,
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which looked to the era in which the Constitution was adopted to find that search warrants
ZHUHDXWKRUL]HGWRORRNIRU³VWROHQRUIRUIHLWHGSURSHUW\RU property liable to duties and
concealed to avoid payment of them, excisable articles and books required by law to be
NHSWZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHPFRXQWHUIHLWFRLQEXUJODUV¶WRROVDQGZHDSRQVLPSOHPHQWVRI
JDPEOLQJµDQGPDQ\RWKHUWKLQJVRIOLNHFKDUDFWHU¶´141
***
By building on historical inquiry into common law antecedents and the Founding
era, the Court looked to original intent as it set out the contours of its Fourth Amendment
doctrine²a relatively robust privacy right. The Boyd rule prohibiting subpoenas of private
papers (and, to some extent, the mere evidence rule as expounded in Gouled) outlined an
H[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\LQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSURSHUW\DQGWKHWeeks exclusionary rule created
a powerful mechanism by which that expectation could be enforced.
IV. FORMALIST EROSION
As new technologies emerged and federal power grew during Prohibition, the Court
began to limit the scope of Fourth Amendment. The Court limited its interpretation of
Entick to a property-centric rationale, leaving behind the traditional rights-maximalist
approach for a formalist (if not literalist) approach that focused on the enumerated list of
protected places rather than on original intent. 142 Three cases²Carroll v. United States,
which created the automobile exception, and Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v.
United States ZKLFK GUHZ WKH ERXQGV RI WKH SULYDF\ ULJKW DW DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V SURSHUW\
line²eroded the strong privacy right that had been established by the traditionalist Court.
A. Carroll v. United States (1925)
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141. Id.
142. See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in
Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 573í81, 609í16 (1996) (arguing that Boyd is an example of the
primacy of natural rights in the Lochner era).
143. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
144. Id. at 146í47.
145. Id. at 147í49 (citing Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne Lumber, Gouled, and Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921)). Amos held that concealed liquor found in a defendant¶s home during a warrantless search was
inadmissible at trial because revenue officers had impliedly coerced his wife to gain entry in the defendant¶s
absence. Like Silverthorne Lumber, the Court¶s opinion in Amos relied entirely on precedential cases²Boyd,
Weeks, and Silverthorne Lumber²and the reasoning of Gouled, released the same day, rather than on history,
Founding-era or otherwise.
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The beginning of the literalist period began in 1925, just five years after the
Eighteenth Amendment took effect. In Carroll v. United States, the Court answered the
question whether a warrantless search for contraband (here, liquor) in a vehicle violated
the Fourth Amendment if conducted with probable cause. 143 The question arose because
WKH 1DWLRQDO 3URKLELWLRQ $FW KDG SURKLELWHG VHDUFKHV RI D ³SULYDWH GZHOOLQJ´ ZLWKRXW D
ZDUUDQWEXWDOORZHGZDUUDQWOHVVVHDUFKHVRIDQ\³RWKHUEXLOGLQJRUSURSHUW\´RQSUREDEOH
cause.144 The Carroll Court began its analysis not with constitutional principle or
Founding-era history, but with examination of precedent.145 It gave lip service to the
WKHRU\WKDW³>W@KH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWLVWREHFRQVWUXHGLQWKHOLJKWRIZKDWZDVGHHPHG
an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will
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146. Id. at 149.
147. Id. at 149í53.
148. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156.
149. Id. at 143í44.
150. Id. at 145í47 (referencing a Senate amendment that would have prohibited warrantless searches of any
property, a House Judiciary Committee report expressing the view that such an amendment would ³greatly
cripple´ enforcement by prohibiting warrantless automobile searches, and the resulting Conference Report that
prohibited warrantless search of a ³private dwelling´ but allowed one of an ³automobile or vehicle of
transportation´ when it is ³not malicious or without probable cause´). As such, the automobile search exception
was the product of both a Constitutional amendment and Congressional deliberation about how that amendment
should be enforced. Query, then, whether it was inevitable that the exception would survive repeal of the
amendment²and what it means that it has.
151. Id. at 147.
152. Id. at 149.
153. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
154. Id. at 284 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)).
155. See supra notes 102í104 and accompanying text.
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FRQVHUYHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWVDVZHOODVWKHLQWHUHVWVDQGULJKWVRILQGLYLGXDOFLWL]HQV´WKHEDVLF
principles that underlie originalism. 146 But its analysis relied entirely on precedent and
interpretation of post-Founding statutes, and it concluded that construction of the
$PHQGPHQW³SUDFWLFDOO\VLQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW´ZDVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKLWV
holding147 that automobile searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when
WKHVHL]LQJRIILFHUKDV³UHDVRQDEOHRUSUREDEOHFDXVH´WREHOLHYHWKDWWKHDXWRPRELOHZDV
carrying contraband liquor.148
7KH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQLQCarroll, written by Chief Justice Taft, began with the text of
the Fourth Amendment and the portion of the National Prohibition Act at issue. 149 It
PRYHGTXLFNO\WROHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\LQWHQGHGWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDW&RQJUHVVLQWHQGHG³WR
make a distinction between the necessity for a search warrant in the searching of private
dwellings and in that of automobiles and RWKHU URDG YHKLFOHV´150 and held that this
distinction was reasonable.151 To provide rationale for that holding, the Court looked first
to its own precedent, but concluded that none of the cases cited were on point regarding
the validity of a warrantless seizXUH³RIFRQWUDEDQGJRRGVLQWKHFRXUVHRIWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
DQGVXEMHFWWRIRUIHLWXUHRUGHVWUXFWLRQ´152 1RQHWKHOHVV³>R@QUHDVRQDQGDXWKRULW\WKH
WUXHUXOHLV´WKDWVXFKDVHDUFKDQGVHL]XUHLVYDOLGLIDQRIILFHUKDVSUREDEOHFDXVH7KH
Court said that the )RXUWK$PHQGPHQWLVWREHFRQVWUXHG³LQWKHOLJKWRIZKDWZDVGHHPHG
DQXQUHDVRQDEOHVHDUFKDQGVHL]XUHZKHQLWZDVDGRSWHG´ 153
In support of its view that a search on probable cause was not considered
unreasonable in the Founding era, the Court quoted from Boyd¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH
customs act. In the quoted passage, the Boyd Court GLVWLQJXLVKHGFRQWUDEDQGDQG³PHUH
HYLGHQFH´EXWLWGLGQRWGRVRHQWLUHO\LQUHOLDQFHRQWKHDFW154 As noted above, the
Boyd Court cited a series of things subject to warrantless search, but only provided
Founding-era authority regarding contraband.155 Boyd looked to Founding-era law on
contraband and customs papers to hold that the Founders could not have seen such searches
as unreasonable, while the Carroll Court excerpted the same sources to distinguish
contraband from mere evidence. And it is notable what the Carroll opinion does not quote
from Boyd: it contained no reference to English or colonial common law, nor to Entick,
nor to its underlying principle of giving the Fourth Amendment a liberal construction.
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Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150í51.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 152í53.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154í56.
Id. at 157±59.
Id. at 163í64 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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The Carroll Court next buttressed its logic with similar provisions in related laws
SDVVHGLQDQGGHVFULELQJHDFKDVSDVVHG³FRQWHPSRUDQHRXVO\ZLWKWKH
DGRSWLRQRIWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW´GHVSLWH the decade that passed between that event
and the passage of the last law.156 Then it walked through similar provisions in statutes
IURP    DQG  QRWLQJ WKDW QRQH ³KDV HYHU EHHQ DWWDFNHG DV
XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO´DQGWKDWRQH ZDV ³WUHDWHGDVRSHUDWLYH´ E\WKH&RXUW157 Still further
afield from the Founding, it referred to statutes allowing warrantless search and seizure on
Indian territory (1820, 1834, and 1917) and in the Alaskan territory (1899). 158 The
SULQFLSOHLWGUHZIURPWKLV³VRPHZKDWH[WHQGHGUHIHUHQFH´WRVWDWXWHV³SUDFWLFDOO\VLQFH
WKHEHJLQQLQJRIJRYHUQPHQW´LVWKH³QHFHVVDU\GLIIHUHQFH´EHWZHHQVHDUFKHVRIVWUXFWXUHV
DQG PRELOH SURSHUW\ WKDW ³FDQ EH TXLFNO\ PRYHG´ 159 But once again, the court
extrapolated from statutes involving customs contraband and ships at a port of entry to
make a broad conclusion about exigent circumstances more generally. It did not do original
historical work to determine, for example, how contraband concealed in a saddlebag or on
a buggy would have been treated in the Founding era. That makes sense as a matter of
FRPPRQODZMXGJLQJEXWLWLVQRWLQNHHSLQJZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VWUDGLWLRQDOLVWDSSURDFK
From there, the opinion took an outright consequentialist turn. The Court
GLVWLQJXLVKHGWKH³ULJKWWRIUHHSDVVDJHZLWKRXWLQWHUUXSWLRQRUVHDUFK´RQKLJKZD\VXQOLNH
national borders, but concluded all that is necessary to overcome that right it is probable
cause.160 7KH &RXUW ORRNHG WR &RQJUHVV¶V LQWHQW WR WKZDUW ERRWOHJJLQJ E\ DXWKRUL]LQJ
searches on probable cause in determining that such searches are reasonable. 161 Finally,
the Court turned briefly to the common law to resolve a secondary issue: whether a seizure
is limited by the common law tradition that one may only be arrested for a misdemeanor
if it was committed LQWKHRIILFHU¶VSUHVHQFH7KH&RXUWORRNHGWRLWVRZQSUHFHGHQWIURP
1885 and 1900, a treatise on English law, and an 1850 case from the Massachusetts
Supreme Court before dismissing the argument on the ground that arrest followed
discovery of contraband (which was found during the search and seizure justified by
SUREDEOHFDXVH ,WFDOOHGWKLVFRQFOXVLRQ³DZLVHRQHEHFDXVHLWOHDYHVWKHUXOHRQHZKLFK
LVHDVLO\DSSOLHGDQGXQGHUVWRRGDQGLVXQLIRUP´ 162 In this regard, Carroll was ahead of
its time.
ChalleQJLQJWKHPDMRULW\¶VQDUUDWLYHRIWKHXQGHUO\LQJIDFWV-XVWLFH0F5H\QROGV¶
GLVVHQWDUJXHGWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWVZHUHDUUHVWHG³XSRQPHUHVXVSLFLRQ´ZLWKWKHVHDUFK
of the car coming only thereafter²and noted that such an action was not authorized by the
Prohibition Act, a law that McReynolds said intended to avoid warrantless search and
seizure at least for first and second offenses, which were misdemeanors. 163 Noting that
FULPLQDO VWDWXWHV DUH ³DOZD\V WR EH VWULFWO\ FRQVWUXHG´ 0F5H\QROGV WRRN D WH[WXDOLVW
approach to distinguish the Prohibition Act from the statutes discussed by the Court, which
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KDG ³GHILQLWHO\ HPSRZHUHG RIILFHUV WR VHL]H XSRQ VXVSLFLRQ´ 164 And he issued a
SULQFLSOHG ZDUQLQJ PXFK PRUH LQ NHHSLQJ ZLWK WKH WUDGLWLRQDOLVW HUD WKDQ WKH &RXUW¶V
opLQLRQ³,IDQRIILFHUXSRQPHUHVXVSLFLRQRIDPLVGHPHDQRUPD\VWRSRQHRQWKHSXEOLF
highway, take articles away from him and thereafter use them as evidence to convict him
RIFULPHZKDWEHFRPHVRIWKH)RXUWKDQG)LIWK$PHQGPHQWV"´165 Though McReynolds
was hardly an ally of Justice Brandeis,166 KHKDGQRQHWKHOHVVVHWWKHWRQHIRUWKHODWWHU¶V
vigorous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.
B. Olmstead v. United States (1928)
The classic Fourth Amendment case in the formalist era was decided in 1928. In
Olmstead v. United States, the Court answered the question whether warrantless wiretaps
RIWHOHSKRQHOLQHV³PDGHZLWKRXWWUHVSDVVXSRQDQ\SURSHUW\RIWKHGHIHQGDQWV´YLRODWHG
the Fourth Amendment.167 :KLOH WKH RSLQLRQ DSSHDOHG WR WKH ³ZHOO-known historical
purSRVH´168 of the Amendment, its analysis is focused on precedential opinions (five of
them the same as those cited in Carroll; the sixth a decision released shortly after it).169
$IWHUFULWLFL]LQJ³WKHVWULNLQJRXWFRPH´RIWKH³VZHHSLQJGHFODUDWLRQ´RIWKHH[FOusionary
rule create by Weeks DQGWKH³H[WUHPHOLPLW´RI)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWSURWHFWLRQVHVWDEOLVKHG
in Gouled,170 WKH &RXUW DSSOLHG D OLWHUDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI ³>W@KH DPHQGPHQW LWVHOI´
FRQFOXGLQJWKDWWKHHQXPHUDWHGOLVWRISURWHFWHGSODFHV³VKRZVWKDWWKHVHarch is to be of
PDWHULDO WKLQJV´ WKH &RXUW WKXV KHOG WKDW ZLUHWDSSLQJ ³GLG QRW DPRXQW WR D VHDUFK RU
VHL]XUHZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRIWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW´ 171
This sharp turn toward literalism is the most striking thing about Olmstead. The
Court stated withoXW FLWDWLRQ WR DQ\ KLVWRULFDO VRXUFHV WKDW WKH ³ZHOO-known historical
SXUSRVH´ RI WKH )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW ³ZDV WR SUHYHQW WKH XVH RI JRYHUQPHQWDO IRUFH WR
VHDUFKDPDQ¶VKRXVHKLVSHUVRQKLVSDSHUVDQGKLVHIIHFWVDQGWRSUHYHQWWKHLUVHL]XUH
against his ZLOO´172 Focusing on the enumerated list allowed the Court to limit protections
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164. Id. at 166±67.
165. Id. at 169. Justice McReynolds was particularly exercised by the facts of the case, quoting the arresting
officer¶s testimony in its entirety and expressing disbelief about the notion that an arrest two and a half months
after the event giving rise to suspicion could amount to probable cause: ³Has it come about that merely because
a man once agreed to deliver whisky, but did not, he may be arrested whenever thereafter he ventures to drive an
automobile on the road to Detroit!´ Id. at 174. Though Justice Scalia speculated in 2013 that he may someday be
regarded as ³the Justice Sutherland of the late-twentieth and early-21st century,´ Senior, supra note 31, here one
can see some overlap with McReynolds.
166. See Adam Liptak, Stevens, the Only Protestant on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2010),
https://nyti.ms/2FvI7Ca (repeating the story, apocryphal story, of McReynolds¶ refusal to sit next to Brandeis for
the Court¶s 1924 portrait).
167. 277 U.S. 438, 455í57 (1928) (explaining how a series of taps collected evidence disclosing ³a conspiracy
of amazing magnitude´), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
168. Id. at 463 (doing no historical work to support its claim).
169. Id. at 458í62 (discussing Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne Lumber, Amos, Gouled, and Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)). The Olmstead Court¶s discussion and quotation of Boyd focused on the sections of
that opinion devoted to statutory interpretation of the 1874 act with regard to the Fifth Amendment, not the
sections discussing Founding-era history or its common law antecedents. See id. at 458í59.
170. Id. at 462í64.
171. Id. at 464, 466.
172. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463. Note that the language again is tinged with the threat of violence²use of
force against a citizen¶s will. That said, the closest the Court comes to considering whether this is in fact true is
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in reference to precedent, not Founding-era history:
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Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our attention hold
the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant, unless there has been an official
search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an
actual physical invasion of his house µor curtilage¶ for the purpose of making a seizure.
Id. at 466.
173. Id. at 463±64.
174. Id. at 464.
175. Id. at 465 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149).
176. Id. at 465±66.
177. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465±66.
178. See id. at 460.
179. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (relying on Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne Lumber, and Gouled,
while distinguishing Carroll because the contraband at issue in Agnello was seized from a home, not a vehicle).
180. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 462±63 (citing the same 1841 state law case as Boyd had to support the view that
³the only remedy open to a defendant whose rights under a state constitutional equivalent of the Fourth
Amendment had been invaded was by suit and judgment for damages,´ and Entick).
181. Id. at 467 (citing state law cases and a treatise in support).
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WR³PDWHULDOWKLQJV´DQGWKHUHE\GLVWLQJXLVKHYHQWKHDFWLRQLQ Gouled (which involved
³DFWXDO HQWUDQFH´ DQG ³WDNLQJ DZD\ RI VRPHWKLQJ WDQJLEOH´  IURP D ZLUHWDS 173 More
dubiously, the Court additionally distinguished the sealed letters in Ex Parte Jackson in
part on the ground that the government holds a monopoly on the carriage of letters, but
³WDNHVQRVXFKFDUHRIWHOHJUDSKRUWHOHSKRQHPHVVDJHV´FDUULHGE\SULYDWHFRPSDQLHV 174
Quoting Carroll¶VVWDWHPHQWWKDW³WKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWLVWREHFRQVWUXHGLQWKHOLJKWRI
ZKDWZDVGHHPHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOHVHDUFKDQGVHL]XUHZKHQLWZDVDGRSWHG´ 175 the Court
KHOGWKDWHYHQOLEHUDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ³FDQQRWMXVWLI\HQODUJHPHQWRIWKHODQJXDJHHmployed
beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to
DSSO\ WKH ZRUGV VHDUFK DQG VHL]XUH DV WR IRUELG KHDULQJ RU VLJKW´ 176 A person making
WHOHSKRQH FDOOVWKH &RXUWVDLG³LQWHQGVWRSURMHFWKLVYRLFH WRWKRVHTXLWHRXWVLGH´ KLV
KRXVHZKLOH³&RQJUHVVPD\RIFRXUVHSURWHFWWKHVHFUHF\´RIVXFKFDOOVIRUWKH&RXUWWR
GRVRZRXOGEHWRDGRSW³DQHQODUJHGDQGXQXVXDOPHDQLQJ´IRUWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW177
$OPRVWDVVWULNLQJDVWKHPDMRULW\¶VOLWHUDOLVWDSSURDFKLVWKHDPRXQWRIWKHRSLQLRQ
devoted to a direct attack on Weeks GHVFULEHG DV ³SHUKDSV WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW´ RI WKH
precedent cited.178 And the one case it added to the five cited in Carroll was Agnello v.
United States, in which the Court applied the exclusionary rule to overturn a conviction
based on the use of unconstitutionally-seized drug contraband as evidence at trial.179
7RJHWKHUWKLVVXJJHVWVWKDWPXFKRIZKDWZDVDWZRUNKHUHZDVWKH&RXUW¶VKRUror that
this carefully-collected evidence would go to waste²a strikingly consequentialist factor
for a formalist Court to consider.
The sole place the Court considered traditional common law rather than its own
precedent was with regard to Weeks. The Court argued that Weeks was in contrast to
³RUGLQDU\FRPPRQ-ODZUXOHV´ZKLFKKHOGWKDW³LIWKHWHQGHUHGHYLGHQFHZDVSHUWLQHQW
WKH PHWKRG RI REWDLQLQJ LW ZDV XQLPSRUWDQW´ 180 This difference was used to reject the
SHWLWLRQHU¶VIDOOEDFNDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHHYLGHnce should be excluded on the grounds that it
ZDVFROOHFWHGLOOHJDOO\³7he Weeks &DVHDQQRXQFHGDQH[FHSWLRQWRWKHFRPPRQODZUXOH´
only for purposes of evidence collected unconstitutionally; in cases of routine illegality,
the common law rule must still apply.181 Once again, the Court turned consequentialist,
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ZRUU\LQJWKDW³>D@VWDQGDUGZKLFKZRXOGIRUELGWKHUHFHSWLRQRIHYLGHQFHLIREWDLQHGE\
other than nice ethical conduct by government officials, would make society suffer and
give criminals greater imPXQLW\WKDQKDVEHHQNQRZQKHUHWRIRUH´182
,Q VWDUN FRQWUDVW WR WKH &RXUW¶V DSSURDFK VWDQGV -XVWLFH %UDQGHLV¶ ZHOO-known
GLVVHQWIRFXVHGRQWKHSULQFLSOHWKDW³WKHULJKWWREHOHWDORQH´LV³WKHULJKWPRVWYDOXHG
E\ FLYLOL]HG PHQ´183 %UDQGHLV¶ dissent presciHQWO\ DUJXHG WKDW WKH &RXUW¶V OLWHUDOLVP
would allow new technology to erode Fourth Amendment protections. 184 To Brandeis, the
historical purpose of the Amendment was not merely to prevent physical intrusion into a
tangible space or physical violence against a person or their property, but rather to address
WKHEURDGHUHYLORIJRYHUQPHQWLQWUXVLRQ,QWKH)RXQGLQJHUD%UDQGHLVZURWH³>I@RUFH
and violence were then the only means known to man by which a government could
directly effect self-LQFULPLQDWLRQ´ WKH HQXPHUDWHG OLVW ZDV WKXV WKH )RXQGHUV¶
manifestation of an aim to prevent that particular evil.185 %XWLQOLJKWRI³VXEWOHUDQGPRUH
far-UHDFKLQJ PHDQV RI LQYDGLQJ SULYDF\´ 186 LW ZDV LPSRUWDQW WR ³UHIXVH>@ WR SODFH DQ
XQGXO\OLWHUDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ´RQWKH)Rurth Amendment²as Boyd had illustrated.187 This
application of Boyd seems very familiar to the modern reader, but is quite different from
WKH &RXUW¶V XVH RI WKH FDVH IRU LWV VWDWXWRU\ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH  FXVWRPV DFW DW
issue.188 Brandeis marshaled a litany of other authorities to support this view, including
both precedent189 and Founding-era history and its common law antecedents.190
Just as the Court in Weeks KDGFRQFOXGHGWKDW³WKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHWK$PHQGPHQW
. . LVRIQRYDOXH´ZLWKRXWWKHH[FOXVLRnary rule,191 and Justice McReynolds had worried
LQGLVVHQWDERXW³ZKDWEHFRPHVRIWKH)RXUWKDQG)LIWK$PHQGPHQWV´LQWKHDIWHUPDWKRI
the Carroll rule,192 IRU-XVWLFH%UDQGHLV³HYHU\XQMXVWLILDEOHLQWUXVLRQE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
YLRODWLRQRIWKH )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW´ 193 Thus²although the Olmstead Court criticized
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182. Id. at 468.
183. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). While Brandeis expressed this thought most famously, Justice Field
had made a similar case when he was a district court judge with language that eventually made its way into a
Supreme Court decision: ³Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of his person
from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.
Without the enjoyment of this right, all other rights would lose half their value.´ In re Pac. Ry. Comm¶n, 32 F.
241, 250 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887), quoted in Interstate Commerce Comm¶n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894).
184. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 473. Brandeis¶ understanding of the right dates at least as far back as an 1890 law review article he
published with Samuel Warren advocating for a common law right to privacy in tort. Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (describing the term ³property´ as comprising
³intangible, as well as tangible´ things).
186. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 473±76 (quoting the ³not the breaking of his doors . . . but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property´ passage from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886)).
188. See id. at 458±59; see also supra note 169.
189. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 477±78 (citing Ex Parte Jackson, Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne Lumber, Gouled,
Amos, Angello, Hale, and Carroll, among others).
190. Id. at 474 (citing James Otis and Lord Camden).
191. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
192. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 169 (1925) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
193. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
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Weeks for breaking with tradition by abandoning the common law²the real departure was
in Olmstead, where the Court abandoned principle grounded in history for literalism
grounded in precedent.
C. Goldman v. United States (1942)

316 U.S. 129, 131±32 (1942).
Id. at 133±34.
Id. at 135.
47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1934).
Nadrone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937).
Id. at 383.
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194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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Although Olmstead was controversial as soon as it was handed down, it survived for
decades and was reaffirmed in a closely related case in 1942. In Goldman v. United States,
the Court DQVZHUHGWKHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUZDUUDQWOHVVXVHRID³GHWHFWDSKRQH´WR³SLFNXS
DQGDPSOLI\´VRXQGWKURXJKWKHZDOORIDQDGMRLQLQJRIILFHLQDPXOWLXQLWEXLOGLQJYLRODWHG
the Fourth Amendment.194 The Court interpreted Section 605 of the 1934
Communications Act, which Congress passed in the aftermath of Olmstead to limit the use
of evidence collected via warrantless wiretapping: because the microphone picked up the
spoken words from next door, not from a telephone wire, the Act did not apply.195 To
resolve the constitutional issue, the Court straightforwardly applied Olmstead, providing
OLWWOHUDWLRQDOHIRUGHFOLQLQJSHWLWLRQHUV¶LQYLWDWLRQWRGLVWLQJXLVKRURYHUUXOHWKDWFDVHLWVHOI
³WKHVXEMHFWRISURORQJHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQ´196
While the Court in Goldman did no new historical research and the dissent only
made passing references to it, the case is useful as the source of three types of evidence
that belie any notion that Olmstead was noncontroversial.
The first is the fact that, six years after the decision was handed down (and little over
D\HDULQWRWKH&RQJUHVVHOHFWHGRQ5RRVHYHOW¶VFRDWWDLOV WKH&RPPXQLFDWLRQV$FW
had limited the scope of what surveillance was permissible. Section 605 prohibited
telecommunications company employees from divulging a communication to anyone
RWKHUWKDQLWVLQWHQGHGUHFLSLHQWDEVHQWDVXESRHQDDQGIXUWKHUSURYLGHGWKDW³QRSHUVRQ
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
FRPPXQLFDWLRQWRDQ\SHUVRQ´197 In 1937, the Supreme Court interpreted that provision
to prohibit federal agents from testifying in court about intercepted communications, even
though other bills intended to prohibit warrantless wiretapping altogether had not
passed.198 The Court found no relevant legislative history to determine Congressional
LQWHQWEXWWKRXJKWLWSODXVLEOHWKDW³>W@KHVDPHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVPD\ZHOOKDYHPRYHGWKH
Congress to adopt section 605 as evoked the guaranty against practices and procedures
violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the
&RQVWLWXWLRQ´199²a connection that provided the rationale for Katz v. United States to
overturn Olmstead three decades later. The decision was issued over a dissent by Justices
McReynolds and Sutherland, who were in the Olmstead majority and took a similarly
FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWDSSURDFKKHUHZRUU\LQJWKDW³WKHQHFHVVLW\RISXEOLFSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVW
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crime is being submerged E\DQRYHUIORZRIVHQWLPHQWDOLW\´200
The second source making clear the controversial nature of Olmstead is a passage at
the end of Goldman:
That case was the subject of prolonged consideration by this court. The views of the court,
and of the dissenting justices, were expressed clearly and at length. To rehearse and
reappraise the arguments pro and con, and the conflicting views exhibited in the opinions,
would serve no good purpose. Nothing now can be profitably added to what was there
said.201

V. REALIST REACTION
Castigated by originalists for lack of faithfulness to the original text of the
Constitution,205 the Warren Court nonetheless halted the literalist erosion of the privacy
ULJKWWKDWUHVXOWHGIURPVWULFWDGKHUHQFHWRWKHSODLQWH[WRIWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VHQXPHUDWHG
places clause. Although the Goldman Court announced fourteen years after Olmstead that
WKHUHZDV³QRJRRGSXUSRVH´WRUHYLVLWLQJWKHFDVHLWZRXOGWDNHOHVVWKDQWZRGHFDGHVIRU
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200. Id. at 387 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
201. 316 U.S. at 136.
202. Id. at 136 (Frankfurter, J. & Stone, C.J., concurring).
203. Id. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 138±39 (³Surely the spirit motivating the framers of that Amendment would abhor these new
devices no less.´).
205. See supra Part I.A.
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That made quick work of the suggestion that Olmstead be overturned.
The third source illustrating the uneasiness about Olmstead are the two dissents in
WKHFDVH)LUVW-XVWLFHV6WRQHDQG)UDQNIXUWHUZURWHWKDWWKH\³VKRXOGKDYHEeen happy to
MRLQ´DPDMRULW\ in overturning Olmstead, but, having failed to achieve one, saw no reason
to repeat the dissenting views from that case.202 Second, Justice Murphy (citing Entick v.
Carrington alongside Boyd DQG%UDQGHLV¶VGLVVHQWLQOlmstead FRQFHGHGWKDW³DOLWHUDO
FRQVWUXFWLRQ´RIWKH$PHQGPHQWPLJKWQRWFRYHUWKHFDVHEXWDUJXHGWKDW³LWKDVQRWEHHQ
the rule or practice of this Court to permit the scope and operation of broad principles
ordained by the Constitution to be restricted, by a literal reading of its provisions, to those
HYLOVDQGSKHQRPHQDWKDWZHUHFRQWHPSRUDU\ZLWKLWVIUDPLQJ´ 203 Taking the same sort
of original intent approach as the Boyd &RXUW 0XUSK\ FRPSDUHG ³WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI
PRGHUQOLIH´WRWKRVHRIWKH)RXQGLQJera DQGFRQFOXGHGWKDWLWZDVWKH&RXUW¶V³GXW\´ to
HQVXUH WKH )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW FRQWLQXHG WR ³VHUYH WKH QHHGV DQG PDQQHUV RI HDFK
VXFFHHGLQJJHQHUDWLRQ´204
***
The key cases of the formalist era²Carroll, Olmstead, and Goldman²established
a literalist interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. But each saw vigorous dissents; the
first two at a time when dissent was relatively rare. Each of those dissents applied
Founding-HUD SULQFLSOHV WR DWWDFN WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQV VKRZLQJ WKDW WKH IRUPDOLVWV¶
crabbed reading of the Fourth Amendment was controversial even at the time. And, though
Carroll survives in a different form to this day, Olmstead and Goldman would soon be
overturned.
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the Court to obliquely do just that. Katz v. United States, the key Warren Court decision
WKDW FUHDWHG WKH PRGHUQ GRFWULQH RI WKH ³UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\´ FLWHG WZR
recent cases (Silverman v. United States and Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden) as
evidence that the Court had moved so far away from the literalism of Olmstead that it was
no longer controlling. In so doing, the Court arguably acted in a manner more in keeping
with the original intent approach of the Boyd Court than it had done in the formalist
decisions above.
A. Silverman v. United States (1961)
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206. 365 U.S. 505, 506±07 (1961).
207. Id. at 509.
208. Id. at 510.
209. Id. at 512.
210. Id. at 511. See also id. at 512 (³But decision here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a
party wall as a matter of local law.´).
211. 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
212. 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (doubting that ³the niceties of tort law initiated almost two and a half centuries ago
. . . are of much aid in determining rights under the Fourth Amendment´).
213. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v.
United States, 335 US. 451 (1948).
214. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (Clark, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 512 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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The first key Warren Court case to draw a line against the formalist position came
in 1961. In Silverman v. United States, the Court answered the question whether
ZDUUDQWOHVVXVHRIDVSLNHPLFURSKRQHSUHVVHGDJDLQVWDKRXVH¶VKHDWLQJGXFWYLRODWHGWKH
Fourth Amendment.206 The Court self-FRQVFLRXVO\VRXJKWWRDYRLG³WKHODUJHTXHVWLRQV´
DERXWWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH³IULJKWHQLQJSDUDSKHUQDOLDZKLFKWKHYDXQWHG
PDUYHOVRIDQHOHFWURQLFDJHPD\YLVLWXSRQKXPDQVRFLHW\´207 The Court distinguished
Olmstead and GoldmanZKHUH³WKHHDYHVGURSSLQJKDGQRWEHHQDFFRPSOLVKHGE\PHDQV
RI DQ XQDXWKRUL]HG SK\VLFDO HQFURDFKPHQW ZLWKLQ D FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\ SURWHFWHG DUHD´ 208
%HFDXVHWKLVFDVHZDV³EDVHGXSRQWKHUHDOLW\RIDQDFWXDOLQWUXVLRQLQWRDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\
protected aUHD´WKDWLVDWUHVSDVVWKHVXUYHLOODQFHYLRODWHGWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW 209
At a glance, Silverman seems to have followed a property-based rationale. But the
reality²as it was in Boyd²LV PRUH FRPSOH[ 7KH &RXUW VWDWHG RXWULJKW WKDW ³)RXUWK
Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real
SURSHUW\ ODZ´210 citing Hester v. United States, which found no Fourth Amendment
violation for a technical trespass onto open fields, 211 On Lee v. United States, which found
no violation when a defendant invited an undercover agent onto his property, even if it
was a technical trespass ab initio,212 and a series of cases in which defendants were found
WRKDYH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWULJKWVLQRWKHUSHRSOH¶VSURSHUW\213 Adding to this confusion,
Justices Clark and Whittaker concurred on the grounds that the physical penetration
³FRQVWLWXWHGVXIILFLHQWWUHVSDVV´WRGLVWLQJXLVKHDUOLHUGHFLVLRQV 214 while Justice Douglas
FRQFXUUHG RQ WKH SUHVFLHQW JURXQGV WKDW ³WKH SULYDF\ RI WKH KRPH ZDV LQYDGHG´ ZLth
SK\VLFDOSHQHWUDWLRQ³EHVLGHWKHSRLQW´215
%HFDXVHWKHLGHDRID³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\SURWHFWHGDUHD´EDVHGYDJXHO\LQDSURSHUW\
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right was set aside in Katz,216 it is important to note that Silverman marked the first time
LWZDVXVHGLQWKH&RXUW¶V)RXUWK$Pendment jurisprudence²all four previous uses, two
by the Court and two in dissents, were in the context of the First Amendment. 217
Moreover, it was used only four times with regard to the Fourth Amendment before Katz
moved away from it²and two of those four XVHVGLVPLVVHGSHWLWLRQHUV¶DUJXPHQWVWKDWLW
applied.218
The takeaway from Silverman is that it was quite self-FRQVFLRXVO\D³WKLVIDUDQGQR
IDUWKHU´219 GHFLVLRQ WKDW JDYH DW OHDVW OLS VHUYLFH WR WKH ³ORQJ KLVWRU\´ RI WKH )RXUWK
Amendment. The Court cited Entick IRUWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWWKH³YHU\FRUH´RIWKH)RXUWK
$PHQGPHQWLVWKH ³ULJKWRIDPDQWRUHWUHDWLQWRKLVRZQKRPHDQGWKHUHEHIUHHIURP
XQUHDVRQDEOHJRYHUQPHQWDOLQWUXVLRQ´DQGUHIHUUHGWRBoyd¶VPRWWRRIobsta principiis.220
And it closed with the statement that, while the Court would not re-examine Goldman, it
ZRXOG³GHFOLQHWRJREH\RQGLWE\HYHQDIUDFWLRQRIDQLQFK´221 Thus, even though Katz
repudiated the Silverman &RXUW¶VXVHRIWKHSKUDVH³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\SURWHFWHGDUHD´WKH
case can be seHQDVDSURWRW\SHRI-XVWLFH6FDOLD¶VSURSHUW\-plus test²one that kept an
easy case easy by concluding that a trespass had occurred.
B. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967)
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216. See infra Part V.C.
217. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 100 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 104 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting); Carpenters &
Joiners Union of Am., Local No. 213 v. Ritter¶s Café, 315 U.S. 722, 734 (1942).
218. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962).
219. Cf. Job 38:11.
220. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511±12.
221. Id. at 512.
222. 387 U.S. 294, 295±96 (1967).
223. Id. at 301 (citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481±85 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Prop. at
104 E. Tenth St., Kansas City, Mo., 367 U.S. 717, 724±29 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362±65
(1959)). The first two cases looked at length to English and colonial history²including, of course, the Wilkes
cases²to review how the amendment interacted with the principle of press freedom. The third depicted the
amendment¶s protections against official invasion as focused on privacy and self-protection. The fact that the
Court did extensive historical research to justify the conclusion that the amendment was grounded in the right to
privacy refutes the notion that the legal realists were purely consequentialist.
224. Warden, 387 U.S. at 301 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
225. Id. at 301±02.
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The second key case of the realist era came in 1967, the same year as Katz. In
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, the Court reconsidered²and eliminated²WKH³PHUH
HYLGHQFH´UXOH222 Rather than revisit primary sources, the Court cited sections from three
FDVHVIURPWRWRVKRZWKDWLWKDG³H[DPLQHGRQPDQ\RFFDVLRQVWKHKLVWRry and
SXUSRVHV RI WKH DPHQGPHQW´223 quoted Boyd in describing the Fourth Amendment as
³LQWHQGHGWRSURWHFWDJDLQVWLQYDVLRQVRIµWKHVDQFWLW\RIDPDQ¶VKRPHDQGWKHSULYDFLHV
RIOLIH¶´224 DQGUHIHUUHGWRWKHWH[WRIWKH$PHQGPHQW IRFXVLQJRQWKH³ULJKWRIWKHSHRSOH
WREHVHFXUH´ 225 7KHVHFLWDWLRQVLOOXVWUDWHWKDWWKH:DUUHQ&RXUW¶VDFWLRQVLQWKLVDUHDGLG
not occur without a look at Founding-era sources and their common law antecedents. Next,
the Court walked through the erosion of property interests in Fourth Amendment
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jurisprudence,226 and concluded with the consequentialist take that the transition to a
privacy-EDVHG UXOH DQG WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH H[FOXVLRQDU\ UXOH SURYLGHG D ³VXEWOH
iQWHUSOD\RIVXEVWDQWLYHDQGSURFHGXUDOUHIRUP´WKDWVXIILFHGWRSURWHFWWKHLQWHUHVWVWKDW
the mere evidence rule once did.227
Hayden was thus the penultimate case in the transition to a privacy-centered Fourth
Amendment regime. The Court stated that it had DOUHDG\ ³UHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKH SULQFLSDO
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and
ha[d] increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property
FRQFHSWV´228 6LPLODUO\WKH³UHPHGLDOVWUXFWXUH´Kad moved from a tort-based system to
the exclusionary rule of Weeks WKRXJK WKH &RXUW VDLG WKDW GHFLVLRQ ³ZDV DUJXDEO\
H[SODLQDEOHLQSURSHUW\WHUPV´ EHIRUHLW³HVFDSHGWKHERXQGVRIFRPPRQODZSURSHUW\
OLPLWDWLRQV´LQSilverthorne Lumber and Gouled229²both cases from the traditionalist era.
While Hayden was straightforward that the Court had moved away from a property-based
common law regime to a privacy-based structure, it did so with citation to a long series of
cases that had walked through Founding-era intent in reaching the conclusion that privacy
was at the core of the Fourth Amendment.
C. Katz v. United States (1967)
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226. Id. at 304±06 (discussing the ³shift in emphasis from property to privacy´ that started as early as
Silverthorne Lumber and Gouled).
227. Id. at 305±10.
228. Warden, 387 U.S. at 304.
229. Id.
230. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
231. Id. at 350.
232. See David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 153±55
(2002) (arguing Katz and Terry v. Ohio took an ³ahistorical approach´ to the Fourth Amendment).
233. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
234. Id.
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The best-known decision of the realist era came just months later. In Katz v. United
States, the Court answered the question whether the warrantless recording of an
LQGLYLGXDO¶VSKRQHFDOOZLWKDPLFURSKRQHRQWRSRIDQHQFORVHGSXEOLFWHOHSKRQHERRWK
violated the Fourth Amendment.230 7KH &RXUW UHMHFWHG WKH SHWLWLRQHU¶V IUDPLQJ RI WKLV
question on two grounds²first, for building an inquiry around whether a particular
SK\VLFDOVSDFHZDVD³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\SURWHFWHGDUHD´DQGVHFRQGIRUVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKH
$PHQGPHQW¶V SURWHFWLRQV FRXOG EH ³WUDQVODWHG LQWR D JHQHUDO FRQVWLWXWLRQDO µULJKW WR
SULYDF\¶´231 7KHQLQRQHRIWKHHUD¶VFODVVLFDOO\FRnsequentialist decisions,232 the Court
overturned Olmstead to hold that the Fourth Amendment did prohibit such surveillance,
EHFDXVHLW³SURWHFWVSHRSOHQRWSODFHV´233
Katz is often treated as revolutionary not only because it overturned Olmstead, but
also because, rather than conducting an historical inquiry, the Court looked to
SUDFWLFDOLWLHV WKH PLFURSKRQH KDG ³YLRODWHG WKH SULYDF\ XSRQ ZKLFK >.DW]@ MXVWLILDEO\
UHOLHGZKLOHXVLQJWKHWHOHSKRQHERRWKDQGWKXVFRQVWLWXWHGDµVHDUFKDQGVHL]XUH¶ZLWKLQ
the mHDQLQJ RI WKH )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW´ 234 Justice Harlan, writing in concurrence,
H[SRXQGHGWKHIRUPXODWLRQWKH&RXUWZRXOGXVHJRLQJIRUZDUGD³UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQ
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235. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting, crucially, that determining what protection the Fourth
Amendment offers people ³generally . . . requires reference to a µplace¶´).
236. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809±12, 817±18 (2004) (arguing that Katz was less revolutionary than
commonly thought, in keeping with the Court¶s norm of deference to statute with regard to new technologies);
see also Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476
(2011). Notably, the ³constitutionally protected area´ term was not eliminated from the Court¶s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by Katz. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (conflating the phrase
with a ³zone of privacy´).
237. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (citing Silverman and Hayden). Crucially, this suggests that the Katz Court saw
Olmstead and Goldman²not Boyd²as creating the ³trespass´ doctrine.
238. See supra notes 210±213 and accompanying text on Silverman; supra notes 223±226 and accompanying
text on Hayden.
239. See supra notes 183±190 and accompanying text on Olmstead; see supra notes 203±204 and
accompanying text on Goldman.
240. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961).
241. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353±54.
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RISULYDF\´ 5(3 WHVWWKDWORRNHGIRUDVXEMHFWLYHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\WKDWVRFLHW\ZDV
³SUHSDUHG WR UHFRJQL]H DV µUHDVRQDEOH¶´235 That standard effectively limited the
revolutionary nature of Katz, because it meant that physical property and space would
remain at the forefront of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence²it quickly became evident
that the 5(3VWDQGDUGRIWHQUHTXLUHVDQH[SHFWDWLRQWREH³EDFNHGE\DULJKWWRH[FOXGH
ERUURZHGIURPUHDOSURSHUW\ODZ´WREHFRQVLGHUHGUHDVRQDEOH 236
This tether to property law affirms the theory that Katz is better understood not as a
revolution in Fourth Amendment law, but rather the culmination of a decades-long
reaction to the formalist literalism of Olmstead. Certainly that is how the Katz Court saw
its actions: it stated that its decisions since Olmstead and Goldman had effectively eroded
ZKDWLWWHUPHG³WKH µWUHVSDVV¶GRFWULQH´VXFKWKDWLWZDVQRORQJHUFRQWUROOLQJ 237 As shown
above, those cases had discussed at length historical considerations and Founding-era
principles.238 Moreover, those cases were themselves echoes of the dissents from
Olmstead and Goldman, which relied in part on similar sources. 239 On this theory, it is
therefore Olmstead that is the outlier, not Katz²regardless of whether the latter explicitly
relied on a historical foundation. If it is true that Katz was eliminating recent common law
precedent that had fundamentally eroded rights the Founders would have intended to
protect, it seems sufficient to rely implicitly on prior work.
Thus, while Silverman KDGGHFOLQHGWRDGGUHVVWKH³ODUJHTXHVWLRQV´SRVHGE\WKH
³IULJKWHQLQJSDUDSKHUQDOLD´RIWhe modern age,240 Katz took them head on. In contrast to
Boyd, which dealt with material (papers) that existed at the time of the Founding, or
Carroll, which dealt with a mode of transport (the automobile) analogous to those of the
Founding era, Katz finally grappled with revolutionary telecommunications technology
with severe privacy implications. It certainly seems that the Katz Court saw itself as halting
DQRQJRLQJHURVLRQRIULJKWVLQNHHSLQJZLWKWKH)RXQGHUV¶LQWHQW'HVFULELQJWKHOlmstead
CouUW DV ³FORVHO\ GLYLGHG´ DQG FDOOLQJ LWV WUHVSDVV-based interpretation of the Fourth
$PHQGPHQW D ³QDUURZ YLHZ´241 the Katz Court instead stated an assumption that
³VHDUFKHVFRQGXFWHGRXWVLGHWKHMXGLFLDOSURFHVV´DUH³SHUVHXQUHDVRQDEOH´VXEMHFWRQO\
WR³D few specifically established and well-GHOLQHDWHGH[FHSWLRQV´VXFKDVWKHGRFWULQHVRI
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search incident to arrest, hot pursuit, and consent. 242 The Court depicted the government
DV³XUJ>LQJ@WKHFUHDWLRQRIDQHZH[FHSWLRQ´IRUVXUYHLOODQFHRIDSKRQHERRWK and it saw
no reason to do so.243
Further suggesting that Katz cannot be fairly criticized for its failure to explicitly
rely on historical sources is the fact that the dissent ignored them too. Justice Black argued
from the point of view of a textualist rather than what we would today call an originalist,
DUJXLQJWKDW³WKHZRUGVRIWKH$PHQGPHQWZLOO>QRW@EHDUWKHPHDQLQJJLYHQWRWKHPE\´
the Court because the enumerated list of protected places describes only tangible things.244
The second half of his dissent focused on Olmstead and the subsequent cases that the Court
had said eroded that holding, redefining them as holding that the Fourth Amendment did
not cover eavesdropping, rather than holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply
absent a trespass. But Justice Black did not go back to Boyd, let alone to Founding-era
sources.245
***
Though Katz became the touchstone of Fourth Amendment law, it is notable that the
case itself pointed to other recent decisions as crucial in shoring up the erosion that resulted
from the turn toward literalism in Carroll and Olmstead. It is particularly of note that
Silverman appears as almost a prototype of the property-plus synthesis Justice Scalia
would develop half a century later. Nonetheless, in light of the manner in which it
incorporated the underlying assumptions of property law, the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy test proved flexible enough to persist for decades.
VI. ORIGINALIST RESTORATION
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242. Id. at 357±58.
243. Id. at 358.
244. Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting). Though writing in dissent, Black admitted that Katz was not a revolution
but rather the final point on a trend line: ³With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the
Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring incessantly to the Fourth
Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an individual¶s
privacy.´ Id. at 373.
245. Id. at 367±72.
246. See Timothy C. MacDonnell, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment: Text, Context, Clarity, and Occasional
Faint-Hearted Originalism, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 175, 232±34 (2015).
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Upon ascending to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia sought to apply his principles
of textualism and originalism to the field of Fourth Amendment law. And, indeed, one of
his most significant accomplishment was to re-DQFKRU WKH &RXUW¶V )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW
theory, if not its doctrine, to the Founding era.246 Over the span of two decades, in
California v. Hodari D., Minnesota v. Carter, and Wyoming v. Houghton, Scalia
rhetorically shifted the conversation to the eighteenth century, taking what he termed an
original public meaning approach to find what was protected in the Founding era. But the
NH\VWRQHRIWKDWVXFFHVVZDVKLVFUHDWLRQRID³SURSHUW\-SOXV´V\QWKHVLVLQKyllo v. United
States, Jones v. United States, and Florida v. Jardines. That synthesis was designed as a
bulwark against erosion of the right²and thus is not so different from Boyd, or even
Silverman.

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 51 Side B

09/18/2019 11:37:45

TEACHOUT, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

96

9/17/2019 2:06 PM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:63

A. California v. Hodari D. (1991)
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247. Two of Scalia¶s earlier opinions suggested unease with Katz but did so only obliquely. In Arizona v.
Hicks, Scalia wrote for the Court in holding that physically moving an object in an individual¶s home exceeds
the scope of the plain view doctrine. 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). ³A search is a search,´ Scalia wrote,
acknowledging that ³the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy
of us all.´ Id. at 329. And in O’Connor v. Ortega, Scalia concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the
plurality¶s application of the Katz test. 480 U.S. 709, 731 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (³Where,
for example, a fireman enters a private dwelling in response to an alarm, we do not ask whether the occupant has
a reasonable expectation of privacy (and hence Fourth Amendment protection) vis-à-vis firemen, but rather
whether-given the fact that the Fourth Amendment covers private dwellings-intrusion for the purpose of
extinguishing a fire is reasonable.´). Curiously, writing for the Court in another 1987 opinion, Scalia rejected a
³procrustean proposal´ that defendants had attempted to root in the common law²explaining that the Court has
³never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the
often arcane rules of the common law.´ Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
248. 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (deciding the issue in order to determine whether drugs dropped by a suspect
running from police were admissible evidence; the wrinkle being that the officer did not have probable cause to
arrest the suspect until he dropped them).
249. Id. at 624±25.
250. Id. at 626.
251. Id. at 627±29 (citing, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)).
252. Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 646±48.
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Justice Scalia began building the foundation for the property-plus test five years into
his tenure, in 1991.247 In California v. Hodari D., the Court answered the question whether
a show of authority (police calling for a fleeing suspect to halt) is a Fourth Amendment
seizure when the suspect does not yield.248 Writing for the Court, Scalia applied a
relatively early version of his trademark textualism. He cited dictionaries from 1828, 1856,
and 1981; cases from 1825, 1862, 1870, and 1874; and treatises from 1930 and 1934 to
HVWDEOLVK WKDW WKH ZRUG ³VHL]XUH´ KDV PHDQW ³>I@URP WKH WLPH RI WKH IRXQGLQJ WR WKH
SUHVHQW´DQDFWRI³WDNLQJSRVVHVVLRQ´249 DQGFRQFOXGHWKDW³WKHODQJXDJHRIWKH)RXUWK
$PHQGPHQW´GRHVQRW³VXVWDLQ>WKHGHIHQGDQW¶V@FRQWHQWLRQ´WKDWDVKRZRIDXWKRULW\LVD
seizure.250 $IWHU GRLQJ WKLV ZRUN 6FDOLD WRRN FDUH WR DGGUHVV WKH &RXUW¶V PRUH UHFHQW
precedent on point.251
While self-cRQVFLRXVO\SXUSRUWLQJWREHDVHDFKDQJH6FDOLD¶VUHYLHZRIKLVWRU\ZDV
neither rigorous nor particularly relevant to establishing what the text of the Fourth
Amendment meant in the Founding era. The oldest dictionary he cited was published
nearly four decades after the Fourth Amendment was ratified, so too his case citations. He
offered no real justification for examining this hodgepodge of sources. Though writing a
\HDUDIWHU&XGGLK\¶VGLVVHUWDWLRQKHGLGQRWFLWHWRLW$QGKLVDUJXPHQWVXQGHUWKHSODLn
meaning of the amendment and modern precedent do just as much work²if not more.
-XVWLFH6WHYHQVDUJXHGLQYLJRURXVGLVVHQWWKDW³WKHPDMRUSUHPLVHXQGHUSLQQLQJWKH
PDMRULW\¶VHQWLUH DQDO\VLV´LV³VHULRXVO\IODZHG´EHFDXVHKatz and Terry v. Ohio took an
³H[SDQVLYHDSSURDFK´WKDW³XQHTXLYRFDOO\UHMHFW>HG@WKHQRWLRQWKDWWKHFRPPRQODZRI
DUUHVW GHILQHV WKH OLPLWV RI WKH WHUP µVHL]XUH¶´ 252 Writing as a legal realist, Stevens
UHDVRQHGIURPWKH&RXUW¶VPRVWUHFHQWSUHFHGHQWDQGZRUULHGWKDWWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRI the
&RXUW¶V ³OLWHUDO-PLQGHG´ KROGLQJ ZRXOG WKUHDWHQ ³YDOXHV WKDW DUH IXQGDPHQWDO DQG
HQGXULQJ´253 Scalia responded to these critiques in footnotes, arguing that Terry only
applied to what standard of suspicion was required to justify a clear-cut physical seizure
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and Katz only applied to expand what items can be seized (but declining to attack either
directly),254 and complaining that his usage of the common law was intenGHGWR³H[SDQG
UDWKHUWKDQFRQWUDFW´WKHPHDQLQJRIVHL]XUH²that is, Scalia (like the Court in Boyd) saw
himself as constructing a bulwark against erosion of the right. 255 But Scalia did not
seriously challenge the notion that he should not be consulting common law sources to do
so. Nor, given that he fully justified the holding with his discussion of Mendenhall, did he
have to. If anything, the dissent gave the opinion more credit for taking a textualist
approach than it deserved.
B. Minnesota v. Carter (1998)
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254. Id. at 627 n.3.
255. Id. at 626 n.2; see MacDonnell, supra note 2466, at 191 (³Once the logical application of a Court-made
test outpaces the [constitutional] text it is meant to implement, the test must yield to the actual words of the
Amendment.´).
256. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 85.
258. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 93±94 (eliding the fact that one could apply a different canon of construction to conclude that the
broader language was intentional merely by stating that there was ³no indication anyone believed´ that to be the
case).
261. Carter, 525 U.S. at 94±95 (citing Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816) for the premise that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect ³only the Lord of the Manor who holds his estate in fee simple,´ but includes
mortgagees, boarders, and so on²but not strangers or visitors taking refuge; query whether this really resolves
the question whether a business guest is protected).
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Seven years later, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) took the opportunity to
ZULWHVHSDUDWHO\LQD)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWFDVHWRFRPSODLQWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VUHFHQWFDVHODZ
³JLYHVVKRUWVKULIWWRWKHWH[WRIWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW´ 256 In Minnesota v. Carter, the
Court answered the question whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
LQ DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V DSDUWPHQW ZKHQ KH ZDV RQO\ WKHUH IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI SDFNDJLQJ
cocaine. The Court held that he did not.257 Scalia agreed, but saw fit to answer a different
TXHVWLRQ ³ZKHWKHU D VHDUFK RU VHL]XUH FRYHUHG E\ WKH )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW has
occurred´258 Consulting a range of sources from Entick through the Founding era, he
FRQFOXGHGWKDWLWKDGQRW EHFDXVHWKRVHVRXUFHVFRQILUPWKH³REYLRXV PHDQLQJ´RIWKH
DPHQGPHQW¶VXVHRIWKHZRUG³WKHLU´ZKLFKLVWRSURWHFWDQLQGLYLGXDORQO\³LQhis own
SHUVRQKRXVHSDSHUVDQGHIIHFWV´259
6FDOLD¶VKLVWRULFDOUHVHDUFKDQGDSSOLFDWLRQLQCarter was more rigorous than it had
been in Hodari D. (although Scalia still ignored Cuddihy²even though Carter came three
\HDUVDIWHU-XVWLFH2¶&RQQRUKDGDSSURYLQJO\FLWHGWKHZRUN 6FDOLDEHJDQZLWKIRXUVWDWH
constitutions that contained language similar to the Fourth Amendment, noting that two of
them intentionally avoided any ambiguity about whose houses were covered, and that two
state ratification conventions sought an amendment with protection specific to an
LQGLYLGXDO¶VSURSHUW\ 260 He affirmed this understanding with a line of common law cases
from both sides of the Atlantic, foregoing Entick for a line of cases dating back to 1604
WKDWHVWDEOLVKWKH ³KRPHLVRQH¶VFDVWOH´PD[LPDQGGLVFXVVLQJDQ0DVVDFKXVHWWV
VWDWHVXSUHPHFRXUWFDVHZKLFKKHGHVFULEHVDVWKH³OHDGLQJ´8QLWHG6WDWHVFDVH 261
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,QFRQWUDVWWRWKLV³FOHDUWH[t and 4-century-ROGWUDGLWLRQ´6FDOLDZURWHVWRRG³WKH
QRWRULRXVO\ XQKHOSIXO WHVW´ RI Katz ZKLFK LV ³VHOI-LQGXOJHQW´ DQG ZKHQ DSSOLHG WR
GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUDVHDUFKKDVRFFXUUHG³KDVQRSODXVLEOHIRXQGDWLRQLQWKHWH[WRIWKH
)RXUWK $PHQGPHQW´262 The diVVHQW¶V UHMRLQGHU ZDV WKDW 6FDOLD¶V ³OLYHO\´ FRQFXUUHQFH
³YLYLGO\UHFDOOV´-XVWLFH%ODFN¶VKatz GLVVHQWUDWKHUWKDQWKH³PDMRULW\RSLQLRQLQKatz,
which stare decisis DQGUHDVRQUHTXLUH>WKH&RXUW@WRIROORZ´263
C. Wyoming v. Houghton (1999)
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262. Id. at 97±98.
263. Id. at 111 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
264. 526 U.S. 295, 297 (1999).
265. Id. at 307 (declining to replicate Scalia¶s Carter analysis of possible distinctions between whose property
is protected by the Fourth Amendment).
266. Id. at 299.
267. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. The degree to which this is a departure should be clear from
Justice Stevens¶ dissent in Hodari D..
268. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) and Hodari D., 499
U.S. at 624 (ignoring the fact that, as discussed in Part VI.A, Hodari D. itself did not cite Founding-era sources).
269. Id. at 300±01 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 (1982)). This matched the motivation of
what Keith Whittington called the ³old originalism,´ a theory developed in reaction to the Warren Court and
those who would advocate for living constitutionalism. See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 36, at 603±
06. Perhaps all Scalia wanted at the time was a restoration of the Boyd model of judging. This approach is
somewhat in keeping with the idea Scalia was a faint-hearted originalist who saw the limits of the theory.
270. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300±02 (roughly 1,000 words including citations to history); id. at 303±06 (roughly
1,045 words including citations to cases applying balancing analysis).
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Justice Scalia¶VILUVWPRYHSXVKLQJWKH&RXUWWRZDUG)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWRULJLQDOLVP
came one year later. In Wyoming v. Houghton, the Court answered the question whether
probable cause may justify the warrantless search of a car and containers within it, even if
those container belong to a passenger. 264 To answer that question in the affirmative,265
6FDOLD ZULWLQJIRUWKH&RXUW VDLGWKDWWKH&RXUW³LQTXLUH>V@ILUVWZKHWKHUWKHDFWLRQZDV
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the [Fourth]
AmendmenW ZDV IUDPHG´266 This was a remarkable move that echoed the lip service
Carroll had given to the same notion, but was an approach that in fact had long since been
abandoned by the Court.267 For support, Scalia cited a 1995 opinion by Justice Thomas
saying the &RXUW³PD\EHJXLGHGE\WKHPHDQLQJDVFULEHGWR>DWHUP@E\WKH)UDPHUVRI
WKH$PHQGPHQW´DQGKLVRZQRSLQLRQ in Hodari D.268
Two other things stand out about Houghton. First, in performing his historical
analysis, Scalia did not cite a single historical source. Instead of eighteenth-century
common law, he cited the work done already by the Court in Boyd, in Carroll and, at the
most length, in a 1982 case, United States v. Ross, that itself relied on Carroll²essentially
reasoning in the manner of a common law judge.269 :KLOH6FDOLD¶VDQQRXQFHGLQWHQWLRQ
to begin with history was new, the nature of the work was not: it has much more in common
with what the Court had done in case after case over two centuries (indeed, Ross itself was
written by Justice Stevens). And second, despite the fact that Scalia stressed the need to
³LQTXLUHILUVW´LQWRKLVWRU\KHDFWXDOO\GHYRWHGVOLJKWO\PRUHZRUGVWRLQWHUHVW-balancing
than to historical analysis.270 Just as he did in Hodari D., Scalia took a belt-and-suspenders
approach to his analysis. Such an approach was necessary: Justice Breyer thought the
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originalist turn sufficiently troubling that he joined the Court but wrote separately to state
WKDW KH GLG VR RQO\ ³ZLWK WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKDW KLVWRU\ LV PHDQW WR LQIRUP but not
DXWRPDWLFDOO\WRGHWHUPLQHWKHDQVZHUWRD)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWTXHVWLRQ´ 271
D. Kyllo v. United States (2001)
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271. Id. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring). Academics at the time were similarly quite critical of Scalia¶s
approach. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739,
1813±14 (2000) (arguing that it is ³unjustified´ by either the text of the Amendment or the discernible intentions
of its Framers).
272. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
273. Id. at 33±34.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See supra note 2555 and accompanying text.
277. Sklansky, Back to the Future, supra note 2322, at 182±84 (taking a more favorable view of Scalia¶s new
tack); see also MacDonnell, supra note 247, at 243 (describing Kyllo as Scalia¶s compromise with Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer²³three traditionally liberal justices´).
278. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (citing a treatise, an article by Judge Posner, and his own concurrence in Carter).
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Two years later, Justice Scalia wrote again for the Court, this time making strides
toward a Fourth Amendment originalism acceptable to his fellow justices²albeit making
some shaky claims in the process. In Kyllo v. United States, the Court answered the
question whether the use of a heat-sensing thermal imaging device to detect heat levels
ZLWKLQDGHIHQGDQW¶VKRPHUHTXLUHVDZDUUDQWHYHQLIGone from a public street.272 Citing
Boyd¶VOHQJWK\TXRWDWLRQVRIEntick to establish that visual surveillance of a home is not
SURWHFWHG 6FDOLD DGPLWWHG LW ZRXOG EH ³IRROLVK WR FRQWHQG WKDW WKH GHJUHH RI SULYDF\
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance
RIWHFKQRORJ\´273 At least with regard to the home, he wrote²without citation to a single
historical source²WKDW³WKHUHLVDUHDG\FULWHULRQZLWKURRWVGHHSLQWKHFRPPRQODZRI
the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
UHDVRQDEOH´274 Prohibiting use of technology to reveal information that would otherwise
EHXQREWDLQDEOHZLWKRXWSK\VLFDOLQWUXVLRQ³DVVXUHVSUHVHUYDWLRQRIWKDWGHJUHHRISULYDF\
against government that existed wKHQ WKH )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW ZDV DGRSWHG´275 As in
Hodari D., Scalia saw himself as constructing a bulwark against erosion of the right. 276
Kyllo may be seen as a triumph for Scalia in two senses: first, he found a way to get
the Court to accept incorporation of Founding-era common law into its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, thus re-rooting the amendment in the eighteenth century; and second, he
did so in a way that advanced his favored theory of that history²one focused on property
rights in general and the law of trespass in particular.
With regard to the first of these, Scalia was successful because he was able to create
a synthesis approach that unified his preferred method with the rationale at the heart of
Katz. In one way, this was a more sophisticated version of the belt-and-suspenders
approach he took in Houghton. But unlike in Houghton, Scalia depicted the common law
in the Founding era as a floor below which privacy may not erode, not a complete guide
to modern protections (curiously, he did so once again without citation to a single historical
source).277 He moderated his criticism of Katz VD\LQJ WKDW WKH WHVW ³KDV RIWHQ EHHQ
FULWLFL]HGDVFLUFXODUDQGKHQFHVXEMHFWLYHDQGXQSUHGLFWDEOH´278 and embracing the fact
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WKDWLWKDG³UHMHFWHG a mechanical iQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW´WRKDOWWKH
encroachment of technology onto privacy rights. 279 Indeed, Scalia advanced a Katz-like
concern about ³ZKDWOLPLWVWKHUHDUHXSRQ>WKH@SRZHURIWHFKQRORJ\WRVKULQNWKHUHDOP
RIJXDUDQWHHGSULYDF\´280 Katz relied on case law to support the assumption that searches
outside the judicial process were per se unreasonable, while Scalia explicitly said that he
relies on Founding-era common law. But neither case cited historical sources, and both
cases sought to ensure that the baseline of Fourth Amendment protections was not eroded
by modern technology or police practice. This is a strange approach for a strong originalist
WRWDNHEXWGHIHQVLEOH$WWKHVDPHWLPHKRZHYHUKHGLGUHLQWURGXFHWKH³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\
prRWHFWHGDUHD´SKUDVLQJXVHGLQSilverman and abandoned in Katz.281
:LWKUHJDUGWRWKHVHFRQGVHQVH6FDOLDRSHQHGZLWKWKHFODLPWKDW³ZHOOLQWRWKH
20th century, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-ODZWUHVSDVV´282
As above, however, that version of events overstates reality²Boyd makes much of
property rights, effectively as a floor, but it is really about the broader principle underlying
the Fourth Amendment; Hester¶V RSHQ ILHOGV GRFWULQH VLPLODUO\ VKRZV WKDW WKH )RXUWK
Amendment was related to common-law trespass, but not tied to it.283 Not only that, but
by citing Goldman and Olmstead to support his claim, Scalia singled out a brief literalist
LQWHUUHJQXPUDWKHUWKDQWKHEURDGHUDUFRIWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFH'HVSLWHKLVRYHUEURDG
opening, however, what Scalia actually did with his opinion is very similar to what Boyd
did: he created a floor (based in physical space and justified by property law) below which
D³UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQ´PD\QRWJRWKHUHE\EXLOGLQJDEXOZDUNDJDLQVWWKHSRVVLELOLW\
WKDWWKH³FLUFXODU´Katz test could erode Fourth Amendment rights in situations where an
individual has lost a reason to expect privacy they once had.
E. United States v. Jones (2012)
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279. Id. at 35.
280. Id. at 27, 34.
281. Id. at 34. See also supra notes 216±221 and accompanying text.
282. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
283. See supra notes 116±119 and accompanying text on Boyd; supra note 211 and accompanying text on
Hester.
284. 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
285. Id. at 405.
286. Id. at 411 (writing in response to Justice Alito¶s concurrence, which complained that the Court decided
the case on ³18th-century tort law,´ id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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Just over a decade later, in 2012, Justice Scalia had the chance to cement his
property-ULJKWVEDVHOLQHLQWRWKH&RXUW¶V)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWWHVW,QUnited States v. Jones,
the Court answered the question whether attaching a GPS tracker to a vehicle without a
warrant was a Fourth Amendment search.284 Scalia briefly used Entick to argue that the
³KRXVHVSDSHUVDQGHIIHFWV´FODXVHSURYHVWKHSULPDF\RISURSHUW\ULJKWV in the Founding
era, though he otherwise relied on case citations rather than historical sources to how the
Court has handled the issue over time. 285 Rather than making trespass the exclusive test,
6FDOLDDSSOLHG³DQWK-century guarantee against unreasonaEOHVHDUFKHV´WRHQVXUHWKDW
the Katz 5(3WHVWGRHVQRW³HOLPLQDWH>@ULJKWVWKDWSUHYLRXVO\H[LVWHG´286 Scalia suggested
that the two-WLHUFKHFNLVWKHFRUUHFWPHWKRGEHFDXVH³>W@KHKatz reasonable-expectation-
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of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
WHVW´287 Because a vehicle is an effect and installation of the tracker physically intruded
onto it, it constituted a search.288
2QFHDJDLQ6FDOLDFODLPHGWKDWWKH&RXUW¶V³)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWMXULVSUXGHQFHZDV
tied to common-ODZ WUHVSDVV DW OHDVW XQWLO WKH ODWWHU KDOI RI WKH WK FHQWXU\´ 289 He
doubled down by describing older cases like Olmstead DVWDNLQJDQ³exclusively propertyEDVHG DSSURDFK´290 ZLWK WKH )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW ³XQGHUVWRRG WR HPERG\ D SDUWLFXODU
concern for government trespass upon the areas . . . LW HQXPHUDWHV´291 On that
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ KH VDZ DV GHWHUPLQDWLYH WKH IDFW WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW ZDV ³SK\VLFDOO\
LQWUXGLQJRQDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\SURWHFWHGDUHD´E\LQVWDOOLQJWKHEHHSHU292 Moreover, in
Jones, he took the opportunity to resolve at least one way in which trespass law and Fourth
Amendment protections are disconnected: an open field, he said, is not one of the areas
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.293
This property-rights focus drew critiques. Justice SotomayRUMRLQHGLQWKH&RXUW¶V
RSLQLRQEXWZURWHVHSDUDWHO\WRVWUHVVWKDW³WKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWLVQRWFRQFHUQHGRQO\
ZLWKWUHVSDVVRU\LQWUXVLRQVRQSURSHUW\´ 294 Sotomayor described Katz DV³HQODUJ>LQJ@´
WKH&RXUW¶V³WKHQ-prevailing focus RQSURSHUW\ULJKWV´295 6KHHPEUDFHG6FDOLD¶VGHSLFWLRQ
RI³DQLUUHGXFLEOHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOPLQLPXP´LQSDUWEHFDXVHRIDFRQFHUQWKDWWHFKQRORJLFDO
DGYDQFHV ZLOO ³VKDS>H@ WKH HYROXWLRQ RI VRFLHWDO SULYDF\ H[SHFWDWLRQV´ HURGLQJ Katz¶s
protections.296 Specifically, she suggested that the scope of metadata that users voluntarily
disclose to telecommunications service providers was so vast that warrantless disclosure
of such material in the aggregate might violate the Fourth Amendment. 297 Given that
Justice Sotomayor was the sole liberal MXVWLFHWRMRLQ6FDOLD¶VRSLQLRQDQGJLYHQWKDWKHU
focus was that diminishing societal expectations of privacy might erode a constitutional
right, it was reasonable to conclude that she had an outsize role in how Scalia shaped his
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287. Id. at 409. Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)
(³Cases such as Silverman . . . hold that, when the government does engage in physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment even if the same information could have been obtained by other means. I do not believe that
Katz, or its progeny, have eroded that principle.´).
288. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. Three years prior Scalia had recognized the limits of originalism in noting that
³the historical scope of officers¶ authority to search vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain.´ Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629±31 (2004)
(Scalia J., concurring in the judgment)).
289. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (citing his opinion in Kyllo and Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 236).
290. Id. (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 406.
292. Id. at 406 n.3.
293. Id. at 410±11 (citing Hester, United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987), and Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 176±77 (1984)).
294. Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
295. Id. (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 414±15.
297. Id. at 418 (³I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the
Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.´); see infra Part
VII.C; see generally Brandon Teachout, Gotta Collect It All!: Surveillance Law Lessons of Pokémon Go, 69
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 83 (2016).
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³SURSHUW\-SOXV´WHVW²a conclusion she affirmed in a tribute to him. 298
By contrast, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan,
concurred in the judgment with an opinion effectively written in dissent, complaining that
WKH &RXUW¶V RSLQLRQ ZDV EDVHG RQ ZKHWKHU WKH FRQGXFW DW LVVXH ³PLJKW KDYH SURYLGHG
JURXQGVLQIRUDVXLWIRUWUHVSDVVWRFKDWWHOV´ 299 $UJXLQJWKDW³WKHPDMRULW\LVKDUG
pressed to find support in post-Katz cases for its trespass-EDVHGWKHRU\´300 Alito simply
applied Katz and found that long-term GPS monitoring impinges on reasonable
expectations of privacy.301
)LQDOO\LWLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKLVFDVHLVLQNHHSLQJZLWK6FDOLD¶VDUJXPHQWLQKLV
Carter concurrence that the Katz test is at its worst when it is used to determine whether a
search occurred in the first place, but is more useful in determining whether that search is
reasonable. One wonders, then, if he saw this case as a midway point to abolishing the
Katz test.
F. Florida v. Jardines (2013)
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298. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, A Tribute to Justice Scalia, 126 YALE LAW J. 1609, 1610±11 (2017) (³I lost
count of the number of communications Justice Scalia and I exchanged with one another, tweaking words and
phrases to keep his majority opinion open for my concurrence.´).
299. Jones, 565 U.S. at 419 & n.2 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing in a footnote that, in fact, it
would not have).
300. Id. at 424.
301. Id. at 430.
302. 569 U.S. 1, 3 (2013).
303. Id. at 6±8.
304. Id. at 11. Seeking this type of pragmatic, one-size-fits-all approach was, of course, a paramount concern
for Scalia. See MacDonnell, supra note 246, at 206±18.
305. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11.
306. Id. at 5.
307. Id. at 13 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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The final step in the creation of Justice ScaOLD¶V³SURSHUW\-SOXV´WHVWIRUWKH)RXUWK
Amendment came in 2013. In Florida v. Jardines, the Court answered the question
ZKHWKHUWUHVSDVVRQWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSRUFKZLWKDQDUFRWLFVGHWHFWLRQGRJEXWZLWKRXWD
warrant, violates the Fourth Amendment. 302 Scalia again cited Entick to stress the unique
role of the home in Founding-era common law and its antecedents, and he again cited
Blackstone to show that the principle that the curtilage of a home is part of the home has
³DQFLHQW DQG GXUDEOH URRWV´²but he otherwise focused on modern case law. 303 Scalia
FRQFOXGHGWKDWVWDUWLQJZLWKD³SURSHUW\-ULJKWVEDVHOLQH´DQGPRYLQJWRWKH5(3VWDQGDUG
RQO\ ZKHQ QHFHVVDU\ ³NHHSV HDV\ FDVHV HDV\´304 Here, because the police physically
intruded into a constitutionally protected area, a violation occurred.305
6FDOLDRQFHDJDLQUHLWHUDWHGWKHLGHDWKDWWKH ³VLPSOHEDVHOLQH´RISURSHUW\ULJKWV
³IRU PXFK RI RXU KLVWRU\ IRUPHG WKH H[FOXVLYH EDVLV´ IRU )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW
protections,306 and once again his focus generated conflicting views: here, a concurrence
IURP-XVWLFH.DJDQDQGGLVVHQWIURP-XVWLFH$OLWR.DJDQZURWHWRQRWHWKDWVKH³FRXOG
MXVWDVKDSSLO\KDYHGHFLGHG>WKHFDVH@E\ORRNLQJWR-DUGLQHV¶SULYDF\LQWHUHVWV´ 307 Like
-XVWLFH 6RWRPD\RU¶V FRQFXUUHQFH LQ Jones, her opinion seems designed to ensure that
6FDOLD¶VRYHUEURDGSUHVHQWDWLRQRISURSHUW\ULJKWVDVcontrolling prior to Katz is not whole-
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heartedly accepted. Kagan noted that, were Jardines to be decided entirely on REP
grounds, Kyllo would have resolved the matter. But a close look at Kyllo reveals that Scalia
ZDVDOUHDG\PRYLQJWRZDUGKLV³SURSHUW\-SOXV´WHVWLQWKDWFDVHEDVHGRQWKHLGHDWKDW
property rights controlled the Fourth Amendment until Katz came down.
For Alito, the action at issue²a police dog on the porch²would have been
acceptable in the Founding era. Alito cited a series of treatises to show the common law
allowed dogs to wander onto private property without committing a trespass, and a 1318
Scottish law prohibiting interference with a police tracking dog to show that dogs have
been used by law enforcement for centuries. 308 Scalia rejected that point: for him, when
SROLFHDUHWUHVSDVVLQJ³WKHDQWLTXLW\RIWKHWRROVWKDWWKH\EULQJDORQJLVLUUHOHYDQW´ 309
Finally, in a short 2015 per curium decision, the Court affirmed the conclusion that
Jones and Jardines had definitively reestablished that physical intrusion on a
constitutionally protected area²LQWKDWFDVHDVXVSHFW¶VERG\²is a search.310
***
:KLOH-XVWLFH6FDOLD¶VDSSOLFDWLRQRIRULJLQDOLVPLQWKLs line of cases fell short of his
stated goal of deriving neutral constitutional meaning from history, it was certainly
SURGXFWLYH (DUO\ LQ 6FDOLD¶V FDUHHU²around the time he described himself as a fainthearted originalist²he conducted an analysis of historical sources to inform the meaning
RI³VHL]XUH´LQHodari D. By the time he was describing common law judging as contrary
to democracy in the late 1990s, he staked out a more aggressive position in Carter and
Houghton, pushing the Court to begin with thH $PHQGPHQW¶V RULJLQDO PHDQLQJ $V KH
began his move toward the property-plus synthesis in the 2000s, each of his three key cases
used that original meaning²defined through physical space²to build a bulwark against
erosion of the Fourth Amendment privacy right. Even though the latter two cases came
around the time that Scalia was repudiating his faint-heartedness and purportedly relying
on the originalist method,311 6FDOLD¶V ³SURSHUW\-SOXV´ V\QWKHVLV ORRNV D JUHDW GHDO OLNH
Boyd and Silverman²that is, it looks like the work of a common law judge.

:LWK-XVWLFH6FDOLD¶VSDVVLQJWKHREYLRXVTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUKLVDWWHPSWWRUHVKDSH
WKH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKWRWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWZLOOHQGXUH²particularly because unique
majorities contributed to each case that contributed to the creation of the property-plus
WHVW7KH&RXUW¶VDQGWHUPVRIIHUHGOLWWOHLQVLJKWLQWRWKHDQVZHU 312 but three
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308. Id. at 23 (Alito, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 11 (majority opinion).
310. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (remanding for the lower court to determine
whether the search was reasonable).
311. See SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 42, at 86±87 (citing Kyllo and Jones as examples of
originalism encompassing ³technology unknown when the operative words took effect´).
312. While there were a handful of Fourth Amendment cases in the post-Scalia 2015 and 2016 terms, none of
those cases directly implicated the enumerated places clause, and none of the opinions deciding them cited much
history.
In Utah v. Strieff, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress
evidence seized incident to arrest when an illegal stop is attenuated by discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant.
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016). Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas noted the exclusionary rule was a twentiethcentury innovation but otherwise imported no historical material into his analysis of the Brown attenuation

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 55 Side A

VII. NOW WHAT?

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 55 Side B

09/18/2019 11:37:45

TEACHOUT, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

104

9/17/2019 2:06 PM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:63

FDVHVIURPWKHWHUPLQGLFDWHWKDW6FDOLD¶VLQFUHPHQWDORULJLQDOLVPZLOOEHDFRQVWDQW
LQ WKH &RXUW¶V FRnsciousness²and, at least for Justice Gorsuch, a primary mode of
analysis.
A. Byrd v. United States (2018)
In Byrd v. United States, the Court answered the question whether the driver of a
rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle wKHQKHKDVWKHUHQWHU¶V
permission to drive the car but was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental
agreement.313 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy applied the reasonable
expectation of privacy test but looked to the right to exclude anRWKHUIURPRQH¶VSURSHUW\
as the determinative factor.314 Because the driver had lawful possession of the car²even
if he breached a contract²he had the right to exclude others from it, and therefore a
reasonable expectation of privacy in it.315
The Court and Justice Thomas (whose concurrence was joined by Justice Gorsuch)
both noted that Byrd also argued that he had a common-law property interest in the car as
a bailee; however, because he raised this argument for the first time on appeal to the Court,
all declined to reach the issue.316 7KRPDVGLGKRZHYHUH[SUHVVKLV³VHULRXVGRXEWV´DERXW
WKHUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\WHVWDQGQRWHGWKDWKHZRXOG³ZHOFRPHEULHILQJDQG
DUJXPHQW´RQWKHEDLOHHWKHRU\LQDIXWXUHFDVH 317 He set out several threshold questions
WKDW ZRXOG KDYH WR EH DQVZHUHG LQFOXGLQJ ³)LUVW ZKDW NLQG RI SURSHUW\ LQWHUHVW GR
LQGLYLGXDOVQHHGEHIRUHVRPHWKLQJFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGµWKHLU . HIIHF>W@¶XQGHUWKHRULJLQDO
meaning of the Fourth Amendment? Second, what body of law determines whether that
property interest is present²modern state law, the common law of 1791, or something
HOVH"´318
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factors. Id. at 2061.
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court held that punishing suspected drunk drivers for refusing to take a blood
test violates the Fourth Amendment, while punishment for refusal to take a breath test is justified under the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016). Writing for the Court, Justice Alito began with
an eighteenth-century manual for justices of the peace, referenced the work of several legal historians, and cited
a series of nineteenth-century cases²but his decision turned on recent precedent and a balancing test. Id. at
2174±75, 2184.
In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, the Court overturned the Ninth Circuit¶s ³provocation rule´ on the grounds
that it violated the ³settled and exclusive framework´ set forth in the Court¶s precedent on excessive force. 137
S. Ct. 1539, 1546±47 (2017).
Finally, in Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court held that Bivens does not allow a suit for damages by post-9/11 detainees
and that their guards enjoyed qualified immunity. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017). Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy contrasted the Court¶s present attitude toward implied rights of action to the ³ancien regime´ of the
1970s but did not return to pre-Bivens history in so doing. Id. at 1855±58. Justice Thomas¶s concurrence in part
complained that the Court had once again failed to look to the common law of 1867, as required by the Civil
Rights Act of that year, which authorized the money damages underlying Bivens. Id. at 1870±72 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
313. 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1523 (2018).
314. Id. at 1526±27 (citing Jardines for the principle that Katz ³supplements, rather than displaces,´ a property
rule). The opinion also mentioned in passing the Founders¶ motivations for the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1526
(quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969)).
315. Id. at 1528.
316. Id. at 1526±27; id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring).
317. Id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring).
318. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1531. The tension between Thomas¶s concurrence and Justice Alito¶s concurrence,

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 55 Side B

09/18/2019 11:37:45

TEACHOUT, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

104

9/17/2019 2:06 PM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:63

FDVHVIURPWKHWHUPLQGLFDWHWKDW6FDOLD¶VLQFUHPHQWDORULJLQDOLVPZLOOEHDFRQVWDQW
LQ WKH &RXUW¶V FRnsciousness²and, at least for Justice Gorsuch, a primary mode of
analysis.
A. Byrd v. United States (2018)
In Byrd v. United States, the Court answered the question whether the driver of a
rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle wKHQKHKDVWKHUHQWHU¶V
permission to drive the car but was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental
agreement.313 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy applied the reasonable
expectation of privacy test but looked to the right to exclude anRWKHUIURPRQH¶VSURSHUW\
as the determinative factor.314 Because the driver had lawful possession of the car²even
if he breached a contract²he had the right to exclude others from it, and therefore a
reasonable expectation of privacy in it.315
The Court and Justice Thomas (whose concurrence was joined by Justice Gorsuch)
both noted that Byrd also argued that he had a common-law property interest in the car as
a bailee; however, because he raised this argument for the first time on appeal to the Court,
all declined to reach the issue.316 7KRPDVGLGKRZHYHUH[SUHVVKLV³VHULRXVGRXEWV´DERXW
WKHUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\WHVWDQGQRWHGWKDWKHZRXOG³ZHOFRPHEULHILQJDQG
DUJXPHQW´RQWKHEDLOHHWKHRU\LQDIXWXUHFDVH 317 He set out several threshold questions
WKDW ZRXOG KDYH WR EH DQVZHUHG LQFOXGLQJ ³)LUVW ZKDW NLQG RI SURSHUW\ LQWHUHVW GR
LQGLYLGXDOVQHHGEHIRUHVRPHWKLQJFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGµWKHLU . HIIHF>W@¶XQGHUWKHRULJLQDO
meaning of the Fourth Amendment? Second, what body of law determines whether that
property interest is present²modern state law, the common law of 1791, or something
HOVH"´318
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factors. Id. at 2061.
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court held that punishing suspected drunk drivers for refusing to take a blood
test violates the Fourth Amendment, while punishment for refusal to take a breath test is justified under the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016). Writing for the Court, Justice Alito began with
an eighteenth-century manual for justices of the peace, referenced the work of several legal historians, and cited
a series of nineteenth-century cases²but his decision turned on recent precedent and a balancing test. Id. at
2174±75, 2184.
In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, the Court overturned the Ninth Circuit¶s ³provocation rule´ on the grounds
that it violated the ³settled and exclusive framework´ set forth in the Court¶s precedent on excessive force. 137
S. Ct. 1539, 1546±47 (2017).
Finally, in Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court held that Bivens does not allow a suit for damages by post-9/11 detainees
and that their guards enjoyed qualified immunity. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017). Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy contrasted the Court¶s present attitude toward implied rights of action to the ³ancien regime´ of the
1970s but did not return to pre-Bivens history in so doing. Id. at 1855±58. Justice Thomas¶s concurrence in part
complained that the Court had once again failed to look to the common law of 1867, as required by the Civil
Rights Act of that year, which authorized the money damages underlying Bivens. Id. at 1870±72 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
313. 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1523 (2018).
314. Id. at 1526±27 (citing Jardines for the principle that Katz ³supplements, rather than displaces,´ a property
rule). The opinion also mentioned in passing the Founders¶ motivations for the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1526
(quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969)).
315. Id. at 1528.
316. Id. at 1526±27; id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring).
317. Id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring).
318. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1531. The tension between Thomas¶s concurrence and Justice Alito¶s concurrence,
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B. Collins v. Virginia (2018)
In Collins v. Virginia, the Court answered the question whether the automobile
exception permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter private
property, approach a house, and search a vehicle (a motorcycle) parked a few feet from
the house²that is, on its curtilage.319 Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor examined
WKH&RXUW¶VSUHFHGHQWRQWKHDXWRPRELOHHxception and on curtilage, concluding that the
former does not trump the latter.320 Although the opinion ultimately turned on the
property-based concept of curtilage, it did not explicitly focus on property. Rather, it took
the classic common-law approach of UHDVRQLQJ IURP SUHFHGHQW 7KH RSLQLRQ¶V VROH
historical reference²WRWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWWKH³PRVWIUDLOFRWWDJH´LVHQWLWOHGWRWKHVDPH
SULYDF\DV³WKH PRVWPDMHVWLFPDQVLRQ´²was made obliquely, quoting a 1982 decision
that paraphrased remarks attributed to William Pitt rather than quoting Pitt himself.321
7KDWWKLVUHIHUHQFHZDVXVHGWRUHEXNH9LUJLQLD¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWRQO\FXUWLODJHLQWKHIRUP
RID³IL[HGHQFORVHGVWUXFWXUH . OLNHDJDUDJH´VKRXOGWUXPSWKHDXWRPRELOHH[FHSWLRQ322
XQGHUVFRUHVWKHZD\WKDW6FDOLD¶VSURSHUW\-SOXVWHVW³PDNHVHDV\FDVHVHDV\´LQDZD\WKDW
preserves the baseline protections of the Fourth Amendment.
7KH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQGUHZDGLVVHQWIURP-XVWLFH$OLWRZKRDUJXHGWKDWWKHVHDUFK
was reasonable under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though it took place on
WKHVXVSHFW¶VFXUWLODJH323 For Alito, the sole value of the curtilage inquiry is to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment applies at all; after concluding that it does, the Court
should apply the automobile exception (and thus conclude that the search at issue was
reasonable).324 $OLWR¶V RSLQLRQ OLNH WKH &RXUW¶V GLG QRW FRQVLGHU )RXQGLQJ-era
principles²let alone sources.
C. Carpenter v. United States (2018)
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which suggested that the driver¶s reasonable expectation of privacy may not have been violated, id. at 1531±32
(Alito, J., concurring), echoed an exchange between Gorsuch and Justice Alito at oral argument, when Gorsuch
advanced a property-focused theory and Alito noted that the word ³property´ does not appear in the Fourth
Amendment. Damon Root, Neil Gorsuch and Samuel Alito Butt Heads Over the Fourth Amendment, Again,
REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Feb. 1, 2018, 10:05 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2018/02/01/neil-gorsuch-andsamuel-alito-butt-heads.
319. 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1668 (2018).
320. Id. at 1671±73.
321. Id. at 1675 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982)).
322. Id. at 1674.
323. Id. at 1680±83 (Alito, J., dissenting).
324. Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1681±82.
325. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). Under the third-party doctrine, information voluntarily conveyed to a third
party does not enjoy Fourth Amendment protection. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442±43 (1976).
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In deciding its first major Fourth AmHQGPHQWFDVHVLQFH-XVWLFH6FDOLD¶VSDVVLQJWKH
Court²or at least several of its members²grappled at last with historical sources. In
Carpenter v. United States, the Court answered the question whether the warrantless
seizure and search of comprehensive cell phone location records is permitted by the Fourth
Amendment.325 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts applied Katz and the common
ODZ WR FRQFOXGH WKDW LW LV QRW ³,Q OLJKW RI WKH GHHSO\ UHYHDOLQJ QDWXUH RI >WKH FHOO-site
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location information], its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable
and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third
SDUW\GRHVQRWPDNHLWDQ\OHVVGHVHUYLQJRI)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWSURWHFWLRQ´ 326 Quoting
Brandeis in Olmstead5REHUWVFRQFOXGHGWKDW³WKHSURJUHVVRIVFLHQFHKDVDIIRUGHGODZ
HQIRUFHPHQWDSRZHUIXOQHZWRRO´²RQHWKDW³ULVNV*RYHUQPHQWHQFURDFKPHQWRIWKHVRUW
the Framers . . GUDIWHGWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWWRSUHYHQW´327 The majority opinion drew
four dissents taking three separate tacks.
Justice Kennedy, like Roberts, applied Katz and the common law, but he came to the
opposite conclusion: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data because the
cell-site location records are created and controlleGE\SURYLGHUV³ZKLFKDJJUHJDWHDQGVHOO
WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQ WR WKLUG SDUWLHV´ DQG EHFDXVH XVHUV YROXQWDULO\ VKDUH ORFDWLRQ GDWD IRU
other purposes.328 Kennedy thus made the case for exactly the type of Fourth Amendment
erosion Justice Sotomayor warned about in her Jones concurrence.329
Justice Thomas wrote to advance a stridently originalist position against Katz, the
WHVWRIZKLFKKHVDLG³KDVQREDVLVLQWKHWH[WRUKLVWRU\RIWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW´ 330 He
recognized that the case was the culmination of a decade-ORQJ³UHWUHDWIURPOlmstead´D
UHWUHDW WKDW KH VDLG UHSODFHG WKH ³RUJDQL]LQJ FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LGHD RI WKH IRXQGLQJ HUD´
property, with a new one²privacy.331 To show that the Founders did not focus on privacy,
7KRPDV FLWHG WKH DEVHQFH RI WKH ZRUG ³VHDUFK´ LQ Founding-era legal dictionaries to
FRQFOXGHWKDWLW³ZDVSUREDEO\QRWDWHUPRIDUW´DQG²with citations indicating that the
full extent of his research was a series of perfunctory electronic database keyword
searches²QRWHVWKHDEVHQFHRIWKHSKUDVH³H[SHFWDWLRQ V RISULYDF\´LQ³SUH-Katz federal
or state case reporters, the papers of prominent Founders, early congressional documents
and debates, collections of early American English texts, or early American
QHZVSDSHUV´332 More seriously, Thomas quickly quoted the usual suspects²the
Commentaries, Coke, Locke, Entick, and Wilkes²to show that the Founders did focus on
property.333 Thomas took the position that the property line is not only a bulwark against
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326. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 2229±30, 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
329. See supra notes 294±298 & accompanying text. Kennedy seemed to recognize that fact and attempted to
refute it, protesting that cell-site location information ³could not reveal where Carpenter lives and works, much
less his µfamilial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,¶´ because the information ³disclose[s]
a person¶s location only in a general area.´ 138 S. Ct. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)). Even allowing arguendo that this is an accurate description of the limits of the
technology, one can imagine a world without those limits²but the same legal logic as to expectations of privacy
would apply.
330. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He also took a moment to observe that ³the
Founders would not recognize the Court¶s µwarrant requirement.¶´ Id. at 2244.
331. Id. at 2236, 2240.
332. Id. at 2238 & nn.2±5 (citing ³NATIONAL ARCHIVES, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov (all Internet materials as last visited June 18, 2018)´; ³A CENTURY OF LAWMAKING
FOR A NEW NATION, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774±1875 (May 1, 2003),
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html´; ³CORPUS OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN ENGLISH,
https://corpus.byu.edu/coha; GOOGLE BOOKS (American), https://googlebooks.byu.edu/x.asp; CORPUS OF
FOUNDING ERA AMERICAN ENGLISH, https://lawncl.byu.edu/cofea´; ³READEX, AMERICA¶S HISTORICAL
NEWSPAPERS (2018), https://www.readex.com/content/americas-historical-newspapers´).
333. Id. at 2239±40.
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334. Id. at 2245±46. Notably, Thomas also looks to the development of the enumerated places clause,
speculating that the changes ³might have narrowed the Fourth Amendment,´ or ³might have broadened´ it. ³Or
it might have done both.´ Id. at 2241. But he declined to draw from this indeterminacy an explicit recognition of
the limitations of a purely historical approach.
335. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2242±43 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 2247±48.
338. Id. at 2248±50.
339. Id. at 2251±52. With all of that said, Alito acknowledges that the Court does now evaluate subpoenas
under the Fourth Amendment²albeit under a lower standard than a physical search²but argues that the majority
fails to follow that standard. Id. at 2252±57.
340. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267±72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 2263.
342. Id. at 2264.
343. Id. at 2265±67.
344. Id. at 2267±68 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013)).
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erosion of Founding-era rights, but a high-water mark as well.334 Thus, because Carpenter
GLGQRWKDYHDSURSHUW\ULJKWLQWKHSURYLGHU¶VFHOO-site records, the Fourth Amendment did
not protect him against their search.335
Justice Alito, joined by Thomas, also took a strident originalist position, but one
focused on attacking the idea that a subpoena may be a search (while agreeing that the
cell-VLWHGDWDZDVQRW&DUSHQWHU¶VSURSHUW\  336 Alito cited Blackstone for the proposition
that the subpoena dates to the fourteenth century and relied on sixteenth and seventeenth
century treatises to trace its development through to the Founding era. 337 In discussing
that period, he cited the Judiciary Act of 1789 (which allowed subpoenas) and two moreor-less contemporaneous English cases (but notably no American counterparts) to show
that the use of subpoenas were routine and wide-ranging.338 $OLWRORRNHGWRWKH)RXQGHUV¶
extensive concern about the violence of physical searches as support for his conclusion
WKDW WKH HQXPHUDWHG SODFHV FODXVH VKRZV WKDW ³$PHULFDQ FRORQLVWV UHEHOOHG against the
&URZQ¶VSK\VLFDOLQYDVLRQVRIWKHLUSHUVRQVDQGWKHLUSURSHUW\QRWDJDLQVWLWVDFTXLVLWLRQ
RI LQIRUPDWLRQ E\ DQ\ DQG DOO PHDQV´ 339 Like Thomas, then, Alito saw Founding-era
property law as creating both a floor and a ceiling for Fourth Amendment rights.
Finally, like Scalia before him, Justice Gorsuch applied a mixture of common law
and originalist analysis to conclude that²LQ VRPH IXWXUH FDVH EHFDXVH ³&DUSHQWHU
IRUIHLWHGSHUKDSVKLVPRVWSURPLVLQJOLQHRIDUJXPHQW´E\QRWDGYDQFLQJLWEHORZ²the
Court will have to consider whether an individual has a property interest in data collected
about him.340 First, he critiqued the third-SDUW\GRFWULQHDUJXLQJWKDW³>F@RQVHQWLQJWRJLYH
a third party access to private papers that remain my property is not the same thing as
FRQVHQWLQJWRDVHDUFKRIWKRVH SDSHUVE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW´ 341 Next, he critiqued Katz,
citing the standards²Entick, Wilkes, and the Writs of Assistance case²for the proposition
WKDWWKH)RXQGHUVVRXJKWWROLPLW³WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWUXVLRQ RQSULYDF\´EXWRQO\³LQ
SDUWLFXODUSODFHVDQGWKLQJV´ DQG³DJDLQVWSDUWLFXODUWKUHDWV´ 342 The Katz test, he said,
provides insufficient guidance to ensure courts stay within these limitations²and, in data
privacy cases, may go the other direction. 343 GorsucKWKHQEURXJKWJRRGQHZV³7KHUHLV
DQRWKHUZD\´²D³WUDGLWLRQDODSSURDFK´EDVHGLQSRVLWLYHODZ 344 He then advanced the
most obvious doctrinal claim for a Fourth Amendment right in papers or effects held by a
WKLUG SDUW\ WKDW WKH\ UHPDLQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V SUoperty but are held by another as a
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bailment.345 While citing cases from the early twentieth century rather than the Founding
era, Gorsuch readily acknowledged that he was raising more questions than answers²and
practically begged for future petitioners to bring forth the latter so that the Court can ensure
WKDWWKH³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOIORRU´RIWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWLVPDLQWDLQHG 346
While the five opinions in Carpenter v. United States represent three distinct
alternatives for the rhetorical direction the Court may take, the likely path forward is
VRPHZKDWFOHDUHU7KH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQZDVIRFXVHGRQDSULQFLSOHGDWLQJEDFNWR Boyd:
there is a baseline of Fourth Amendment protection that shall not be eroded. While
Gorsuch dissented, his opinion squarely followed ScDOLD¶VIRRWVWHSV²and exhorts litigants
to do the same. From Jones, we know that Sotomayor²who joined the Carpenter majority
but did not write²shares an appreciation for that approach. And Thomas and Alito, who
clearly reach very different conclusions, remain serious about taking a historical approach.
Thus, taken as a whole, the opinions in Carpenter VXJJHVW WKDW 6FDOLD¶V SURSHUW\-plus
synthesis will endure.
***
:KLOHZHZHUHRQFHIDPRXVO\VDLGWREH³DOOUHDOLVWV´347 ZHDUHQRZVDLGWREH³DOO
originalistV´348 ,W LV SDVW WLPH WR EH UHDOLVWLF DERXW RULJLQDOLVP (YHQ LI 6FDOLD¶V
originalism-in-practice was not as novel as he claimed, his use of history not always that
ULJRURXVDQGKLVGHVFULSWLRQRIWKH&RXUW¶VWUDGLWLRQDOIRFXVRQSURSHUW\RYHUGUDZQWKH
three key Fourth Amendment cases of the post-Scalia era strongly suggest that his effort
to return the Court to its traditional use of Founding-era sources and their common law
antecedents²that is, his incremental originalism²will prove a legacy worthy of the
&RXUW¶VHPEUDFH
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345. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268±69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878)).
346. Id. at 2268±72 (³Neglecting more traditional approaches may mean failing to vindicate the full protections
of the Fourth Amendment. . . . These omissions do not serve the development of a sound or fully protective
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.´).
347. See Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917 & nn.
1±2 (2005) (citing usage).
348. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010).

